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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past twenty years, trade between the United States and Canada
has grown from just under $58 billion' to over $322 billion per year.2 Begin-
ning with the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement in the 1980's 3 and
* Associate Professor of Law, Haworth College of Business, Western Michigan University.
B.B.A., 1981; J.D., 1985 University of Michigan. I would like to thank the Dean of the Haworth College
of Business for a mini-grant to support this research and the staff at the Waldo library Resource Sharing
Center for their assistance. I would also like to thank Howard P. Knopf and Henry C. Su for their insights
into Canadian competition law and legal research which undoubtedly reduced the number and severity of
errors made in this article.
See U.S. Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business, Dec. 1977, at 32.
2 See U.S. Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business, Apr. 1998, at 80, 81.
See generally, J. Timothy Kennish, Competition Issues Arising from Free Trade-A Canadian
Practitioner's Perspective (1988).
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continuing into the 1990's with the North American Free Trade Agreement
("NAFTA"), 4 the United States and Canada have sought to increase the
already large volume of trade between the two countries. As trade between
the United States and Canada increases, it becomes increasingly important to
understand each other's domestic laws,5 including antitrust law.6 Not
surprisingly, the increase in trade has brought with it an increase in
transborder antitrust enforcement activity.7
An examination of Canadian predatory pricing law is justified not only by
the volume of trade between the United States and Canada, but also by the
treaties and agreements between the two countries that call for cooperation in
the enforcement of antitrust law. As one commentator noted, "effective
antitrust enforcement goes hand in hand with the lowering of governmental
barriers in achieving open and competitive markets,"' and promotion of "fair
competition" is one of NAFTA's express objectives.9 NAFTA requires the
signatories to adopt their antitrust laws,' but it does not specify a basis for
harmonizing their antitrust policies.'" Instead, NAFTA requires cooperation
4 The North American Free Trade Agreement is reprinted at James R. Holbein & Donald J.
Musch, The Practitioner's Deskbook Series: NAFTA 105-939 (1994).
5 See Paul Collins & D. Jeffrey Brown, National Antitrust Laws in a Continental Economy: A
Comparison of Canadian and American Antitrust Laws, 65 ANTrrRusr L.J. 495, 534 (1997) ("The
increasing level of economic integration.., between Canada and the United States... demands a certain
cognizance respecting the application of the laws of the country in which an entity carries on its business.")
6 Stephen F. Ross, Antitrust Lessons from "The True North Strong and Free", 65 ANrrRUST LJ.
467, 492 (1997) ("Expanding trade between the United States and Canada makes knowledge of the
competition laws or our northern neighbors vital to antitrust practitioners and scholars.").
Charles S. Stark, International Antitrust Cooperation in NAFTA: The International Antitrust
Assistance Act of 1994, 4 UNrrED STATEs-MExico L.J. 169, 173-74 (1996).
8 Id. at 169.
9 NAFTA Art. 102(b).
1o NAFTA Art. 1501(1) ("Each Party shall adopt or maintain measures to proscribe anti-
competitive business conduct and take appropriate action with respect thereto.") This is consistent with
the United States' policy of treating antitrust law as a matter of domestic policy. Spencer Weber Waller,
National Laws and International Markets: Strategies of Cooperation and Harmonization in the
Enforcement of Competition Law, 18 CARDOZO L REV. 1111, 1118 (1996) ("The United States has staked
its policy for the forseeable future on [international] cooperation as an alternative to either unilateralism,
harmonization, or the creation of a true international antitrust law. ... Enforcement plus cooperation
maintains our commitment to antitrust as an important dimension of this country's legal and civic system...
. Harmonization and true international antitrust would only weaken national power, ultimately require
externally driven change in doctrine and procedute, and expose U.S. firms to majoritarian international
controls that have been historically unacceptable."). Note that this stands in contrast to the European Union
which has a body antitrust law subscribed to by all its members. Kathleen Murtaugh Collins, Harmonizing
the Antitrust Laws of NAFTA Signatories, 17 LOY. LA. INT'L & COMP. LJ. 157, 158 (1994).
1 Mark R. Joelson, Antitrust/Competition Law Aspects of NAFTA, 40 FED B. NEWS & J. 573
(1993) ("The reader who plunges into the provisions of the proposed North American Free Trade
Agreement... in the expectation of finding a well developed set of competition or antitrust law principles
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in the enforcement of each country's domestic antitrust laws. 2 NAFTA also
establishes a Working Group on Trade Competition with a mandate to make
recommendations "on relevant issues concerning the relationship between
competition laws and policies and trade."' 3 A variety of other agreements
between the United States and Canada pledge cooperation in the enforcement
of antitrust laws supplement NAFTA's provisions.14 In an effort to facilitate
further agreements, Congress enacted the International Antitrust Assistance
Act of 1994."5
Furthermore, the Canadian approach to antitrust law may offer the United
States a viable alternative to the approach offered by the dominant "Chicago
School."' 6  Antitrust law in the United States has entered a period of
reassessment. Although the United States Supreme Court continues to rely
heavily on Chicago School analysis and scholarship, 17 other policy makers and
legal scholars have begun to abandon Chicago's monomaniacal focus on
economic efficiency. For example, Gerla has sought to restore rivalry as the
central tenet of antitrust law.' Averitt and Lande have proposed a "consumer
sovereignty" model for antitrust law that emphasizes the existence of
consumer choices. 9 Nader has urged an antitrust policy that focuses on
concentration and wealth transfers rather than economic efficiency. 0 Even
will be disappointed"). Indeed, NAFTA even denies the signatories "recourse to dispute settlement under
this Agreement for any [antitrust] matter." NAFTA Art. 1501(3).
12 NAFTA Art. 1501(2) ("The Parties shall cooperate on issues of competition law enforcement
policy.").
13 NAFTA Art. 1504.
14 For an overview of these agreements through the summer of 1995, see Stark, supra note 7, at
170-73.
is International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6201-6212 (1994).
Talks between the United States and Canada quickly followed the enactment of the IAEAA. Waller,
supra note 10, at 1118. It appears, however, that the first IAEAA agreement will be with Australia, not
Canada. U.S., Australia Propose First-Ever Mutual Antitrust Assistance Agreement, 72 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) 386 (1997).
16 Christopher J. Maule & Thomas W. Ross, Canada's New Competition Policy, 23 GEo. WASH.
J. INT'L L. & ECON. 59, 62 (1989) ("Given the structural similarities between the Canadian and U.S.
economies, it seems likely that any Canadian success could be readily transferable south of the Canadian
border.").
17 See, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 118 S.Ct. 275, 282 (1997) (Court explicitly relied on Posner
and Bork to support its conclusion that "vertically imposed maximum prices" cannot "harm consumers or
competition.").
is Harry S. Gerla, Restoring Rivalry As a Central Concept in Antitrust Law, 75 NEB. L. REV. 209
(1996).
19 Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Sovereignty: A Unified Theory of Antitrust and
Consumer Protection Law, 65 ANTITRuST L.J. 713 (1997).
20 Ralph Nader, The Proper Goals of Antitrust: When Public and Private Interests Collide, 9 Loy.
CONSUMER L REP. 115 (1997). For a more sophisticated argument regarding antitrust law as a prohibition
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scholars who are not yet ready to abandon economic efficiency as a goal of
antitrust law have attacked the Chicago School's "reliance on a selective, even
myopic, use of economic arguments and claims" that generate "legal tolerance
of undesirable structures and inefficient economic conduct.'
Scholars dissatisfied with the Chicago School of antitrust law have yet to
fashion an equally coherent alternative.2 The antitrust laws of other countries
may embody different values than the Chicago School.23 An examination of
the actual workings of antitrust laws in other countries may yield better
alternatives to the Chicago School approach or other theoretical models
developed by economists and legal scholars. Given its proximity to the United
States, as well as a common language and a shared legal history, Canada is a
natural choice for such consideration.2
Predatory pricing offers an excellent place to begin the study of the
similarities and differences between the antitrust laws of the United States and
the competition laws of Canada. Since predatory pricing can constitute a
criminal offense in both countries, it is a particularly important issue for
business. Furthermore, hostility to predatory pricing claims has long been a
hallmark of the Chicago School model. 25 Although Canadian scholars have
advocated development of predatory pricing law along the lines advocated by
Chicago scholars in the United States, Canadian law has actually developed
an approach to predatory pricing that emphasizes empirical evidence over
economic theory.
II. PREDATORY PRICING LAW IN THE UNITED STATES
Few areas of United States antitrust law proved more problematic over the
past thirty years than predatory pricing. Conceptually, the doctrine is easily
on wealth transfers, see, Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of
Antitrust, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65 (1982).
21 Peter C. Carstensen, Director and Levi after 40 Years: The Anti-Antitrust Agenda Revisited, 17
Miss. C. L REV. 37, 38 (1996).
22 See, e.g., David F. Shores, Law, Facts and Market Realities in Antitrust Cases After Brooke and
Kodak, 48 SMU L. REV. 1835, 1855 n.88 (1995) (Advocating a '"more judicious if less tidy approach
[which] recognizes that proper application of the antitrust laws often requires a balancing of competing
goals embraced by Congress.").
23 See, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust and Values: where liberals and Libertarians Meet, 9 LOY.
CONSUMER L RE'. 132, 134-36 (1997) (Contrasting various European approaches to antitrust law with that
of the United States.).
24 Cf. Ross, supra note 6, at 469 ("IB]ecause Canada's legislative response to economic problems
has often been passed or reformulated after the American legislation is in place, their approach can reflect
a fresher and possibly superior look.").
25 See Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L REV. 925, 926-
27 (1979).
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understood. Predatory pricing occurs when the predator firm drops its prices
and sells its products at loss in an effort to drive its competitors from the
market. Once the competitors have left the market, the predator may raise its
prices and enjoy monopoly profits.26 Although the United States Supreme
Court has primarily dealt with predatory pricing under the Robinson-Patman
Act,27 predatory pricing can also constitute monopolization or attempted
monopolization in violation of the Sherman Act.28 The standards under the
two statutes are essentially the same.29
2 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and Its Practice 298
(1994) ("In its most orthodox form, 'predatory pricing' refers to a practice of driving rivals out of business
by selling at a price below cost. The predators intent--and the only intent that can make predatory pricing
rational, profit-maximizing behavior-is to charge monopoly prices after rivals have been dispatched or
effectively disciplined."); Stephen F. Ross, Principles of Antitrust Law 55-56 (1993) ("Predation is best
defined as a generic term to describe a firm's sacrifice of short-term profits in the expectation that these
losses will be recouped in the future through the realization of monopoly profits"); Robert H. Bork, The
Antitrust Paradox : A Policy at War with Itself 144 (1978) ("Predation may be defined.., as a firm's
deliberate aggression against one or more rivals through the employment of business practices that would
not be considered profit maximizing except for the expectation either that (1) rivals will be driven from the
market, leaving the predator with a market share sufficient to command monopoly profits, or (2) rivals will
be chastened sufficiently to abandon competitive behavior the predator finds inconvenient or threatening.").
27 The Robinson Patman Act amended section 2 of the Clayton Act, and provides in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person... to discriminate in price between different purchasers of
commodities of like grade and quality, ... where the effect of such discrimination may be
substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to
injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives
the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them....
15 U.S.C. § 13(a).
The Robinson Patman Act also contains a criminal provision which provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person... to sell.., goods at unreasonably low prices for the purpose
of destroying competition or eliminating a competitor.
15 U.S.C. § 13a.
2 Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any
other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof,
shall be punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person,
$350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the
discretion of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 2.
29 This was not always the case. In A.A. Poultry Fams, Inc., the Seventh Circuit noted that "[t]o
conclude that [the defendant] did not engage in predatory pricing [under section 2 of the Sherman Act] is
not necessarily to absolve it under the Robinson-Patman Act." 881 F.2d 1396, 1404 (7th Cir. 1989). The
problem stemmed from the Supreme Court's decision in Utah Pie that simple "price discrimination in an
oligopolistic market contributing to the erosion of price levels may violate" the Robinson-Patman Act. 881
F.2d at 1404. In other words, Utah Pie suggested that the Robinson-Patman Act condemns primary-line
discrimination because of its potential to lower prices below competitive levels. The Seventh Circuit,
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Beginning with some of their earliest writings in the late 1950's,3"
Chicago School scholars began to argue that predatory pricing rarely, if ever
occurred.3 No rational firm, they argued, would engage in such tactics. Since
the predator loses profits on each unit of product sold, the predator suffers
increasing losses as its competitors retreat and the predator's unit sales
expand.32 Even if the predator eliminates all of its competitors, the successful
predator cannot raise its prices above competitive levels because monopoly
profits would attract new entrants into the market and force prices back down
to competitive levels.33 Because the current losses from predatory pricing are
however, felt that the Sherman Act condemned predatory pricing only for its potential to raise prices above
a competitive level. Thus, it seemed that "the Robinson-Patman Act condemns at least some primary line
discrimination that the Sherman Act permits." 881 F.2d at 1405.
Brooke Group, discussed infra, resolved this apparent conflict between the Sherman Act and Robinson-
Patman Act. Rather than overruling Utah Pie or adopting different tests for the different statutes, Brooke
Group denied the existence of a conflict between the recoupment test and its reasoning in Utah Pie. 509
U.S. 209, 221(1993). The Court held that "the Robinson-Patman Act should be construed consistently with
[the] broader policies of the antitrust laws," 509 U.S. at 220 (quoting Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., Inc.
v. FTC, 440 U.S. 69, 80 n.13 (1979)), i.e., "primary-line competitive injury under the Robinson-Patman
Act is of the same general character as the injury inflicted by predatory pricing schemes under Section 2
of the Sherman Act" 509 U.S. 209, 221(1993). The Court, therefore, required proof of below-cost pricing
and recoupment for both Sherman Act predatory pricing claims and Robinson-Patman Act primary-line
discrimination claims. 509 U.S. at 222-27. According to the Court, the two claims differ only in that
primary-line price discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act requires "a reasonable prospect" of
recoupment, while predatory pricing under Section 2 of the Sherman Act requirs "a dangerous probability"
of recoupment. 509 U.S. at 224. (Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, "it is generally required that to
demonstrate attempted monopolization a plaintiff must prove (1) that the defendant has engaged in
predatory or anticompetitive conduct with (2) a specific intent to monopolize and (3) a dangerous
probability of achieving monopoly power." Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 113 S.Ct. 885, 890-91
(1993)).
30 See, e.g., John S. McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J.L. &
ECON. 137 (1958).
31 See, e.g., Bork, supra note 26, at 155 ("predatory price cutting is most unlikely to exist");
Kenneth G. Elzinga, Predatory Pricing: The Case of the Gunpowder Trust, 13 J.L & ECON. 223 (1970);
Roland H. Koller 1I, The Myth of Predatory Pricing: An Empirical Study, 4 ANTrrRusT L & ECON. REv.
105 (1971); Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CH. L REv. 263
(1981).
32 See Easterbrook, supra note 31, at 268 ("The larger the predator's market share, the faster it
loses money"); Bork, supra note 26, at 149 ("Losses during a price war will be proportionally higher for
the predator because he faces the necessity of expanding his output at ever higher costs, while the victim
not only will not expand output but has the option of reducing it and so decreasing his costs.").
33 See Posner, supra note 25, at 927 ('[1f [the predator] tries to recoup [his lost profits] by raising
his price, new entrants will be attracted, the price will be bid down to the competitive level, and the attempt
at recoupment will fail.") Although a leading scholar and jurist in Chicago School, Posner disagrees with
the notion that predatory pricing is irrational. Id. at 940. Posner suggests that strategic considerations may
cause a rational firm to engage in predatory pricing. Id. at 939-40. Posner further suggests that most of his
fellow Chicago School adherents have missed this point because "economics contains no generally accepted
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certain and the future gains are speculative, no firm would consider predatory
pricing a profitable long run strategy. 4 Finally, the Chicago School argued
that evidence of the predator's intent to hurt competitors should be irrelevant
because economic efficiency is the only goal of antitrust law35 and a firm's
subjective intent has no bearing on economic effects of its conduct.36
At first, the doctrines suggested by the Chicago School had little influence
on mainstream antitrust law scholarship and jurisprudence. In 1967, for
example, the United States Supreme Court established a low threshold for
predatory pricing claims in Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co..
37
Professors Areeda and Turner set off an avalanche of predatory pricing
scholarship with a suggestion in 1975 that antitrust laws should only condemn
below-cost pricing, regardless of the alleged predator's intent to eliminate its
competitors. 38 Although Areeda and Turner gave much more credence to
predatory pricing claims than Chicago School scholars, their use of a cost
based test instead of evidence of subjective intent was consistent with Chicago
School thinking.39 During the 1980's, the Supreme Court seemed to embrace
the Chicago School skepticism about predatory pricing in a series of cases
dealing with other issues, and, as discussed infra, the Court hinted that it
would condemn only below-cost pricing. Nonetheless, the Court refused to
address the issue of predatory pricing directly, and the different circuits split
on whether and to what extent they would adopt the "Areeda-Turner test" for
predatory pricing.
theory of strategic behavior." Id. at 939.
34 See Easterbrook, supra note 31, at 272 ("Because the losses during the predation may be large,
and the risk of nonrecoupment great, even the ability to collect a monopoly profit after knocking the victim
out of the market may not be enough to make predation profitable when evaluated ex ante.").
33 See Easterbrook, supra note 31, at 266 n. 11 ("[The antitrust laws should be treated as if they
served no other goal than economic efficiency.").
36 See Easterbrook, supra note 31, at 280 ("A predator's malicious intent could not increase the
economic effects of its conduct.").
37 386 U.S. 685 (1967).
39 Phillip E. Areeda and Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section
2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L REv. 697 (1975). Among the more widely cited responses to the so-
called Areeda-Turner test were F.M. Scherer, Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act: A Comment, 89
HARV. L REV. 868 (1976); Oliver E. Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis,
87 YALE LJ. 284 (1977); Paul L Joskow and Alvin K. Klevorick, A Framework for Analyzing Predatory
Pricing Policy, 89 YAL.E L.J. 213 (1979). A more complete, albeit somewhat dated, discussion of the
scholarship can be found in Joseph F. Brodley and George A. Hay, Predatory Pricing: Competing
Economic Theories and the Evolution of Legal Standards, 66 CoRNELL L REv. 738 (1981).
39 See Posner, supra note 25, at 940-44.
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A. Brooke Group
In 1993, the case of Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 40 presented the Supreme Court with an almost textbook example of
predatory pricing in an oligopolistic industry.' Faced with a declining
demand for its branded cigarettes, the plaintiff introduced "black and white"
generic cigarettes in 1980. Generic cigarettes proved to be a great success,
and the plaintiff's market share nearly doubled "from a low of just over 2%
in 1980 to a high of just over 5% in 1984. ' 42 Among the other five firms
which dominated the cigarette industry, the growth of the plaintiff's generic
cigarettes hit the defendant the hardest. 43  The defendant responded by
introducing its own generic cigarettes in 1984 with wholesale prices below the
plaintiff's and a price war ensued. Previously, the six firms which made up
the cigarette industry had not engaged in any significant price competition,"
and "[l]ist prices for cigarettes increased in lock-step, twice a year, ...
irrespective of the rate of inflation, changes in the costs of production, or
shifts in consumer demand."45 The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had
entered into the generic segment of the market and ignited the price war in
order to coerce the plaintiff into raising its prices, thereby narrowing the gap
in price between generic and branded cigarette and returning the industry to
oligopolistic rather than competitive price levels.
1. BELOW-COST PRICING
As noted supra, Professors Areeda and Turner laid out the fundamental
arguments in favor of a below cost pricing test nearly twenty years prior to
Brooke Group.4" The Areeda-Turner test quickly caught on in the lower
federal courts, and in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio
40 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
4 The Supreme Court found that:
The cigarette manufacturing has long been one of America's most concentrated industries....
The cigarette industry also has long been one of America's most profitable, in part because for
many years there was no significant price competition among the rival fis.... Substantial
evidence suggests that... the industry reaped the benefits of prices above a competitive level....
Id. at 213.
42 Id. at 213.
43 Id. at 214 ("Although [the defendant] sold only 11.4% of the market's branded cigarettes, 20%
of the converts to [the plaintiff's] black and whites had switched from a ... brand [of the defendant's]").
Id. at 213.
45 Id.
Areeda and Turner, supra note 38.
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Corp., 47 the Supreme Court suggested in dicta48 that predatory pricing
consisted of "pricing below some appropriate measure of cost. 49 A year later,
in Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc.,50 a case which turned on the
question of "antitrust injury,'. the Court reiterated its dicta that predatory
pricing "may be defined as pricing below an appropriate measure of cost."52
Even though the Court did not squarely hold that predatory pricing requires
pricing to be below the alleged predator's costs, 53 most observers viewed the
appropriate measure of cost as the next major issue for the Court to resolve.
Indeed, the Court seemed to indicate as much in Cargill when it acknowl-
edged a conflict among the circuits on the issue.'
Brooke Group clearly held "only below cost prices should suffice" to state
a claim for predatory pricing and rejected "the notion that above-cost prices
that are below general market levels or the costs of a firm's competitors inflict
injury on competition cognizable under the antitrust laws."55 The Court feared
that it could not prohibit predatory above cost price cutting "without courting
intolerable risks of chilling legitimate price-cutting."'  Furthermore, the Court
believed that price cutting is "most conducive to a breakdown of oligopoly
pricing and the onset of competition" in a concentrated market such as the
cigarette industry even if the purpose behind the price cutting was "to
demonstrate to a maverick the unprofitability of straying from the group." '57
Finally, the Court felt that it simply "does not constitute sound antitrust
47 Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
48 Matsushita involved allegations that Japanese television manufacturers had violated Section 1
of the Sherman Act by conspiring to use predatory prices for their television sets sold in the United States.
475 U.S. at 578. Although Matsushita involved predatory claims, the Court decided the case based on the
plaintiffs inability to offer sufficient evidence of a conspiracy. 475 U.S. at 595-98.
49 475 U.S. at 584 n.8.
5 479 U.S. 104 (1986).
51 Antitrust injury is a doctrine which requires a private plaintiff to prove not only that it has been
injured by the defendant's violation of the antitrust laws, but also that its injury is "injury of the type the
antitrust laws were intended to prevent." 479 U.S. at 109; see also, Norman W. Hawker, The New Antitrust
Paradox: Antitrust Injury, 44 RUTGERS L REV. 101 (1991).
52 479 U.S. at 117 ("Predatory pricing may be defined as pricing below an appropriate measure
of cost for the purpose of eliminating competitors in the short run and reducing competition in the long
run.").
53 Although the dicta in both Matsushita and Cargill left open the possibility that a price above
cost but "below the level necessary to sell [the alleged predator's] products," the decisions were generally
understood as endorsing the requirement of below-cost pricing. 479 U.S. at 117-18 n. 12 ("[W]e find it
unnecessary to [consider]... whether above-cost pricing coupled with predatory intent is ever sufficient to
state a claim of predation.").
54 479 U.S. at 117 n.12.
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policy" to "depriv[e] consumers of the benefits of lower prices" during the
period of predatory conduct.5 8 Unfortunately, the Court did not give a clear
indication of what is the appropriate measure of cost. 9 Instead, the Court
chose to focus on a new issue, recoupment.
2. RECOupMENT
The Court's insistence on proof of recoupment represented a significant
change in its approach to predatory pricing law. As noted supra, although
Matsushita accepted the reasoning that predatory pricing rarely occurred
because firms could not rationally expect to recoup the losses generated from
predatory pricing, it defined predatory pricing as simply "pricing below some
appropriate measure of cost. '6° Utah Pie ignored the issue of recoupment
altogether, focusing instead on predatory intent.6 '
Although the recoupment test represented a significant change to the
Court's approach to predatory pricing, it was not altogether unanticipated.
Professors Joskow and Klevorick proposed a similar framework for predatory
pricing analysis some fifteen years prior to Brooke Group.62 Furthermore, the
Seventh Circuit had already adopted a recoupment test in its 1989 decision,
A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc.,63 stating that below-cost
pricing "bestows a gift on consumers [, and] antitrust laws are designed for the
benefit of consumers." 64
The underlying basis for the recoupment test in Brooke Group may be
found in the Court's statement that the "painful losses" imposed by below-cost
pricing on the predator's "targets is of no moment... it competition is not
injured."'65 The Court has long held that Congress adopted the antitrust laws
I ld. at 224.
39 Id. at 223 n. 1 ("Because the parties in this case agree that the relevant measure of cost is average
variable cost, ... we again decline to resolve the conflict among courts over the appropriate measure of
cost.").
60 475 U.S. 574, 585 n.8 (1986). Cargill also defined predatory pricing as "pricing below an
appropriate measure of cost for the purpose of eliminating competitors in the short run and reducing
competition in the long." 479 U.S. at 117.
61 Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 696 (1967).
62 Joskow and Klevorick, supra note 38.
63 881 F.2d 1396 (7th Cir. 1989).
64 ld at 1401. In addition to its shared concern about depriving consumers of the benefits of below-
cost pricing, the Seventh Circuit felt that it "is much easier to determine from the structure of the market
that recoupment is improbable than it is to find the cost a particular producer experiences." Id at 1401.
65 509 U.S. 209,224 (1993); see also Id. at 225 ("[lt was not enough to inquire 'whether the
defendant has engaged in 'unfair' or 'predatory' tactics'; rather, ... the plaintiff must prove 'dangerous
probability that [the defendant] would monopolize a particular market').
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for "the protection of competition, not competitors."66  What matters,
however, is what the term "competition" means. The Court in Brooke Group
defined competition in terms of low prices to consumers,67 i.e., competition
would be injured only if the predator were ultimately able to raise prices. The
Court emphasized its belief that the "costs of an erroneous finding of liability
are high"'  because low standards would turn predatory pricing claims into "a
tool for keeping prices high."' Thus, a predatory pricing claim requires proof
not only of below-cost pricing, but also of the predator's recoupment of "its
investment in below-cost prices."70
The recoupment test, as defined by the Court, consists of two elements.
First, the plaintiff must show that "below-cost pricing [is] capable... of
producing the intended effects on the firm's rivals."'" This in turn requires
evidence "of the extent and duration of the alleged predation, the relative
financial strength of the predator and its intended victim, and their respective
incentives." 72 Second, the plaintiff must prove that there is a "likelihood" that
a successful predator would raise prices high enough for a long enough period
of time to "compensate [the predator] for the amounts expended on predation,
including the time value of the money invested in it."'73 In other words, the
plaintiff must show that at the time the defendant began to engage in below-
cost pricing, the scheme had a determinable expected net present value of at
least zero. This "requires an estimate of the cost of the alleged predation and
6 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294,320 (1962) (emphasis in the original).
67 The Court stated that without recoupment through higher prices, "predatory pricing produces
lower aggregate prices in the market, and consumer welfare is enhanced." 509 U.S. at 224. Despite the fact
that Brooke Group produces a result favored by the so-called "Chicago School" of antitrust analysis, the
Chicago School holds that "antitrust should concern itself solely with allocative and productive efficiency."
Bork, supra note 26, at 109. By definition, below-cost pricing does not flow from productive efficiency
(lower costs of production), nor does it promote allocative efficiency. Indeed, "[t]he relationship between
the inefficiency caused by predatory prices that drop below marginal cost and the undercharges associated
with such pricing is conceptually similar to the relationship between the inefficiency caused by cartel prices
that rise above marginal cost and the overcharges associated with such pricing." Wesley J. Liebeler, Whither
Predatory Pricing? From Areeda and Turner to Matsushita, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1052, 1071 (1986).
The Court acknowledged that a failed attempt at predatory pricing would cause allocative inefficiencies,
but it was not concerned about this since "unsuccessful predation is in general a boon to consumers." 509
U.S. at 224. In the Court's mind, low prices for consumers, not efficiency, must be the overriding goal of
antitrust law.
68 509 U.S. at 226.
6 Id. at 227.
70 Id. at 224.
71 Id. at 225.
Id.
73 509 U.S. 209, 225 (1993).
1999]
212 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol.7:201




Although the test for predatory pricing established in Brooke Group need
not be interpreted as setting an especially high threshold to recovery,75 the
Supreme Court expressly stated it's intent to establish a difficult standard.76
In an apparent attempt to emphasize the difficulty of satisfying the recoupment
test,77 the Court, in an unprecedented move, 78 reviewed the sufficiency of the
evidence presented at trial rather than remanding the case back to the district
court.79 The Court's application of the recoupment standard has led some to
conclude that Brooke Group "is likely to have the same effect as if it had
created a flat prohibition on" predatory pricing claims.s°
The plaintiff in Brooke Group seemed to have presented "unusually strong
evidence" in support of its case," and the Court conceded that "as an abstract
74 Id. at 226.
75 Professors Joskow and Klevorick proposed a similar framework for predatory pricing analysis
some fifteen years prior to Brooke Group. Joskow and Klevorick, supra note 38. Although Joskow and
Klevorick offered a framework which they believed would minimize the errors of wrongly finding predatory
pricing and wrongly falling to find predatory pricing, id. at 215 & 217, they later suggest that an
examination of the market structure to gage the chances of long term gains from predatory pricing, i.e.,
recoupment, would "eliminate the need for further judicial inquiry into pricing behavior" for "most firms
in the economy." Id. at 258. More recently, Professor Klevorick has criticized the law of predatory pricing
as it had developed prior to the Brooke Group decision for falling to take into account economic literature
suggesting that predatory pricing may be rational and, therefore, more commonly occurring than had been
previously thought. Alvin K. Klevorick, The Current State of the Law and Economics of Predatory Pricing,
83 AM. ECON. REV. 162 (1993).
76 509 U.S. at 226 ("[T]hese prerequisites to recovery are not easy to establish.").
77 Phillip Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and
Their Application T711.2, at 395 (Supp. 1994) ("Rather than leave the lower courts to apply its standard,
the Supreme Court took pains to review the factual basis for the jury verdict.., and thereby to demonstrate
the stringency of its test.").
78 See Kenneth L Glazer, Predatory Pricing and Beyond: Life After Brooke Group, 62 ANTrTRUST
L.J. 605 (1994).
7 The Court conceded that it was "not customary" for it "to review the sufficiency of the
evidence," 509 U.S. 209, 230 (1993), but it felt compelled to do so in Brooke Group in order to provide
"guidance concerning the proper application of [the] legal standard." Id.
so Glazer, supra note 78, at 624; Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 77 at 396 ("By the stringency
of its demand for proof of recoupment, the Court cleared the way for summary rejection of most predatory
pricing claims"); cf. Shores, supra note 22, at 1858 (Arguing that "practical market realities were not
critical to the Court's decision.... mhe reasonableness of the expectation of recoupment was tested against
economic theory rather than actual market realities, [and] the Court applied economic theory to overrule
fact-findings.").
81 Glazer, supra note 78, at 606.
PREDATORY PRICING LAW
matter" the plaintiffs claim in Brooke Group was "within the reach of" a
predatory pricing claim.' The Court found that the plaintiff had successfully
established specific intent 3 and below-cost pricing."' The Court even found
that the below-cost prices had the intended effect of disciplining the plaintiff."5
Nonetheless, the Court found that the plaintiff failed "to show that in pursuing
this scheme, [the defendant] had a reasonable prospect of recovering its losses
from the below-cost pricing."6
Surprisingly, the Court did not engage in the careful analysis of the market
factors it had called for in setting forth the recoupment test, choosing instead
to focus on what it saw as deficiencies in the plaintiff's argument that the
defendant would recoup its losses when the plaintiff raised its prices on
generic cigarettes.8 7 According to the plaintiff, as the price difference between
generic and branded generics narrowed, many price sensitive consumers
would switch back to branded cigarettes, "thus slowing the growth of the
[generic] segment and reducing cannibalization of branded sales and their
associated supracompetitive profits."88 The Court had already noted the
existence of "[s]ubstantial evidence... that... the industry reaped the benefits
of prices above a competitive level" for branded cigarettes, 9 and the Court did
not dispute that some consumers would switch to branded cigarettes as the
difference in price between branded and generic cigarettes narrowed.'o The
Court, however, held that it was not enough to show that the price gap
between generics and branded cigarettes narrowed and that the consumers
who reacted to higher priced generics by switching back to branded cigarettes
would pay supracompetitive prices. The Court insisted that the narrowing of
the price gap had to result from the raising of generic prices above a
92 509 U.S. at 230.
93 Id. at 231 ("[Tjhe record contains sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could
conclude that [the defendant] envisioned or intended this anticompetitive course of events.").
Id. at 231 ("[There is also sufficient evidence in the record from which a reasonable jury could
conclude that for a period of approximately 18 months, [defendant's] prices on its generic cigarettes were
below its costs.").
85 509 U.S. at 209, 231 (1993) ("[Tlhis below-cost pricing imposed losses on [plaintiff] that
[plaintiff] was unwilling to sustain, given its corporate parent's effort to locate a buyer for the company.").
86 Id. at 231.
97 Kenneth G. Elzinga & David E. Mills, Trumping the Areeda-Turner Test: The Recoupment
Standard in Brooke Group, 62 ANrrrRuST L.J. 559, 575 (1994).
n 509 U.S. at 231.
89 Id. at 213.
90 The Court, however, did dispute that the price gap had in fact narrowed. Id. at 236. Yet that is
not the issue, even on the Court's own terms. What matters is not whether price gap actually narrowed
enough to allow recoupment, but whether the defendant reasonably believed the price gap would narrow
enough to allow recoupment.
1999]
214 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:201
competitive level.9 This is not to say the recoupment had to come from the
sale of generic cigarettes at supracompetitive prices, but if recoupment were
to come from branded cigarettes, then the price increase in generics which
caused consumers to switch to brand cigarettes must be the "product of
nonmarket forces."'92
The Court held that only two types of evidence could establish a
reasonable prospect of raising generic prices above competitive levels: "first,
if generic output or price information indicates that oligopolistic price
coordination in fact produced supracompetitive prices in the generic segment;
or second, if evidence about the market and [the defendant's] conduct indicate
that the alleged scheme was likely to have brought about tacit coordination
and oligopoly pricing in the generic segment, even if it did not do so." 93 With
respect to the first point, plaintiff's evidence revealed that after the predatory
pricing caused it to relent and raise prices on generics, "list prices on...
generic... cigarettes increased twice a year." These semiannual "price
increases outpaced increases in costs," and the "list prices of generics... rose
at a faster rate than the prices of branded cigarettes, thus narrowing the list
price differential between branded and generic products."94 Although the
Court had earlier suggested that the semiannual, "lockstep" price increases of
branded cigarettes constituted "[s]ubstantial evidence" of "prices above a
competitive level" for branded cigarettes, 9 it flatly refused to draw the same
inference from the same type of evidence regarding the pricing of generic
cigarettes. The Court disputed the veracity of the plaintiff's evidence of price
increases, pointing out that "promotional schemes, including coupons,
stickers, and giveaways" may have reduced the actual prices paid by
consumers.96 The Court cited the introduction of "subgeneric" cigarettes in
1988 at even steeper discounts from branded cigarettes than those previously
91 The thrust of the Court's reasoning here is that non-collusive price increases are allocatively
efficient. "If prices rise in response to an excess of demand over supply, or segment growth slows as
patterns of consumer preference become stable, the market is functioning in a competitive manner." 509
U.S. at 209, 232 (1993). Cdnsequently, "fo]nly if those higher prices are a product of nonmarket forces
has competition suffered." Id. There are numerous problems with the Court's application of this reasoning
in Brooke Group. First, the Court ignored its own finding that the plaintiff raised its prices in response not
to shifting demand or preferences, but rather in response to the defendant's below-cost pricing. Id. Second,
what matters is not what actually happened, but what the defendant reasonably expected to occur, since
the issue for recoupment is whether the defendant reasonably expected to recoup its losses in a case of
attempted monopolization.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 233.
94 id. at 235.
I5 d. at 213.
96 /d. at 236.
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associated with generics in support of its conclusion that the price gap actually
increased, rather than decreased.' Finally, the Court concluded that even if
prices had increased, the price increases could not support an inference of
oligopolistic price coordination. First, since production of generics had
increased, "rising prices are equally consistent with growing product
demand." 98 Second, and perhaps more importantly, the plaintiff's "own
officers and directors consistently denied that they or other firms in the
industry priced their cigarettes through tacit collusion or reaped
supracompetitive profits." 99
In a case of attempted monopolization, the issue is not whether the
defendant succeeds in recouping its losses from predatory pricing, but whether
there was a dangerous probability of success. Here too, the Court found the
plaintiff's evidence lacking. Plaintiff offered no evidence of overt collusion
between the defendant and its competitors. Consequently, as the Court noted,
the "only means by which [the defendant could] have established oligopoly
pricing... is through tacit price coordination with the other cigarette firms. ''""o
The Court examined the evidence regarding the market structure and
found that the characteristics of the industry were such that notwithstanding
the defendant's stated objective "to slow the growth of the [generic] segment,
no objective evidence of its conduct permits a reasonable inference that it had
any real prospect of doing so through anticompetitive means."' 1 The Court
stated that tacit coordination is facilitated by "a stable market environment,
fungible products, and a small number of variables upon which the firms
seeking to coordinate their pricing may focus."'0 2 All of these were absent,
according to the Court. When the defendant began its below-cost pricing, "the
cigarette market was in an obvious state of flux.' 0 3 Furthermore, the "large
97 509 U.S. at 209, 236 (1993).
9 Id. at 237.
99 Id. While it is not surprising for the Court to reject an inference oligopolistic pricing for generic
cigarettes which contradicts the plaintiff's own testimony, it is surprising for the Court to draw the inference
of oligopolistic pricing for branded cigarettes when the inference is drawn from the same evidence and
contradicted by the same testimony.
100 Id. at 238.
to] Id. at 241. This is a particularly troublesome holding given that the Court had previously noted
the cigarette industry had successfully avoided price competition "for many years" in the branded segment,
Id. at 213, which suggests that the market structure for cigarettes was conducive to tacit collusion. With
respect to the defendant's stated belief that it could succeed in achieving coordinated pricing of generics
after its below-cost pricing succeeded in disciplining the plaintiff, the dissent aptly noted that according
to classic Chicago School analysis, "lawyers know less about the business than the people they represent
[and the] judge knows even less about the business than the lawyers. Id. at 257 n.1 8 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(quoting Frank H. Easterbrook, The Lmits of Antitrust, 63 TEx. L REv. 1, 5 (1984).
102 509 U.S. 209, 238 (1993).
103 Id.
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number of product types and pricing variables also decreased the probability
of effective parallel pricing."'"
Finally, the Court said, "[e]ven if all the cigarette companies were willing
to participate in a scheme to restrain the growth of the generic segment, they
would not have been able to coordinate their actions and raise prices above a
competitive level unless they understood that [the defendant's] entry into the
segment was not a genuine effort to compete with" the plaintiff.10 5 The Court
rejected the plaintiff's argument that the defendant signalled its intent through
the defendant's price lists, because the plaintiff could produce "no docu-
ments... that indicated any awareness of [the defendant's] supposed signal by
its principal rivals."' 6
B. Summary and Critique
The basic elements of a predatory claim are easily stated. A plaintiff must
prove below-cost pricing and recoupment. Recoupment requires proof that the
intended victim would likely succumb, which in turn depends on "the extent
and duration of the alleged predation, the relative financial strength of the
predator and its intended victim, and their respective incentives and will."
10 7
Recoupment also requires proof that the predatory pricing scheme will
ultimately prove profitable. This depends on three factors: (1) whether "the
market is highly diffuse and competitive," (2) the existence of barriers to entry
in the market, and (3) whether the defendant has or easily can obtain the
"capacity to absorb the market shares of his rivals."10' 8 Finally, in conspiracy
cases, the fact that prices rise steeply after the plaintiff succumbs to the
defendant's below-cost pricing will not prove recoupment unless the plaintiff
can also show that the price increase resulted from concerted action.
Despite the clarity as to the elements necessary to prove predatory pricing,
the Court failed to articulate a coherent rationale for its stringent application
of the test to the facts presented in Brooke Group. Chicago scholars have
generally applauded the result in Brooke Group,139 but the test it established
is not truly consistent with Chicago reasoning. Brooke Group, to be sure,
104 Id. at 239.
105 Id. at 240.
106 Id. at 241.
107 Id. at 225.
"'8 Id. at 226.
109 See, e.g., Elzinga & Mills, supra note 87; Keith Allen May, Casenote, Brooke Group Ltd. v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.: A Victory for Consumer Welfare Under the Robinson-Patman Act,
28 U. RICH. L REv. 507 (1994); Daniel J. Gifford, Predatory Pricing Analysis in the Supreme Court, 39
Antitrust Bull. 431 (1994); Mark 1. Schwartz, The Brooke Decision: The Supreme Court Revisits Predatory
Pricing, 99 COMM. L.J. 276 (1994).
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adopts Chicago's beliefs that "'predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and
even more rarely successful,' ... and the costs of an erroneous finding of
liability are high."'' n There are, however, distinctly non-Chicago elements in
the Court's reasoning. For example, Chicago School analysis holds that a
small firm can always raise enough capital to wait out the predation of its
larger rival,"' but Brooke Group includes the relative financial strength of the
parties as part of the recoupment test."' Chicago, moreover, holds that
efficiency, i.e., "consumer welfare," is the only valid goal of antitrust law."'
Nonetheless, Brooke Group acknowledges that even without recoupment,
below-cost pricing is inefficient." 4
Although Brooke Group is not an unqualified endorsement of Chicago,
the decision fails to consider any of the "post-Chicago" economic learning
about the strategic use of predatory pricing. This is indeed an unfortunate
oversight. As the Supreme Court has grown increasingly skeptical about the
existence of predatory pricing in the "real world,""' economists have
developed an increasing body of scholarship based on strategic behavior and
other factors which suggests that predatory pricing is a rational, if not
frequent, form of business conduct." 6 Strict adherence to the elements of
recoupment as defined in Brooke Group would nonetheless deny consider-
ation of the strategic factors identified by post-Chicago thought as essential
for understanding predatory pricing as a rational phenomenon."'
11 509 U.S. 209, 226 (1993) (Quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574,589 (1986)); Jonathan B. Baker, Predatory Pricing After Brooke Group: An Economic Perspective,
62 ANTITRUST L.J. 585, 603 (1994) (The Court "awarded judgment as a matter of law based on Chicago
School presumptions, without reconsidering Chicago arguments in light of contemporary developments in
economics.").
I Elzinga & Mills, supra note 87, at 575 ("[A] small firm with few internal resources may be able
to ride out a time of predation by borrowing in the capital markets against its prospects in the future once
prices rise.").
112 509 U.S. at 225.
13 Bork, supra note 26, at 51, 91.
114 509 U.S. at 224 ("[U]nsuccessful predatory pricing may encourage some inefficient substitution
toward the product being sold at less than its cost.").
15 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986) ("['fhere is a
consensus among commentators that predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and even more rarely
successful.").
116 See James E. Meeks, Predatory Behavior as an Exclusionary Device in the Emerging
Telecommunications Industry, 33 WAKE FOREST L REV. 125, 132, 136-41 (1998); Walter Adams & James
W. Brock, Predation, "Rationality," and Judicial Somnambulance, 64 U. CIN. L REV. 811, 855-67
(1996); Alvin K. Klevorick, The Current State of the Law and Economics of Predatory Pricing, 83 AM.
ECON. REV. 162 (1993).
11 Baker, supra note 110, at 602 ("[P]ost-Chicago developments were not noted by the Court in
Brooke Group, and they were not brought to the Court's attention by the parties."); Elzinga & Mills, supra
note 87, at 579 (The plaintiff "did not appeal explicitly to any established theory of strategic behavior and
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If the Court in Brooke Group was not concerned with economic efficiency
or post-Chicago economic theory, then what was it concerned with? The
answer may be low prices."1 The Court repeatedly stated that it feared that
low standards for predatory pricing claims might result in the use of antitrust
suits as "a tool for keeping prices high."...9  Indeed, although the Court
conceded the inefficiency of below-cost pricing without recoupment, it
nonetheless insisted on proof of recoupment because "unsuccessful predation
is in general a boon to consumers."' Brooke Group stopped short of saying
that lowering prices is legal per se, but that may have been the Court's
message. 1
2
Read in its entirety, Brooke Group suggests there is no such thing as an
illegal price cut, but businesses may act on that thinking at their own peril.
Since the "death knell" of predatory pricing is found in Brooke Group's
application of the test to the evidence and not the test itself, and since Brooke
Group failed to articulate a coherent basis for its stringent application of the
test, Brooke Group will be as easily distinguished when post-Chicago
attorneys ascend to the bench as Utah Pie was in Brooke Group." Indeed,
one seeking to distinguish Brooke Group need only point out that the
plaintiff's own executives denied the existence of an essential fact needed to
prove recoupment in the cigarette industry, tacit coordination.
While the Areeda-Turner test's conclusive presumption that prices above
average variable cost were not predatory 123 was not without faults, it had the
singular virtue of clearly delineating legal conduct. By referring to its own
cost data, a firm could know whether it had violated the antitrust law. Given
that recoupment ultimately turns on the court's interpretation of evidence
regarding not only the alleged predator's costs, but also the victim's financial
the Court saw no need to shoehorn one into the case.").
ji Cf. Shores, supra note 22, at 1854 ("The most likely explanation for the Brooke Court's
treatment of the recoupment issue is the notion that the antitrust laws, including the Robinson-Patman Act,
only prohibit conduct injurious to consumers. Below-cost pricing with no reasonable prospect of
recoupment cannot injure consumers regardless of the predator's subjective intent because the predator will
never be able to realize its goal of increasing price.").
19 509 U.S. 209, 227 (1993).
120 Id. at 224.
121 If so, this would place the Supreme Court squarely at odds with the original intent of the
Sherman Act. This statute was enacted in an era characterized by consistently falling price levels, therefore,
it makes little sense that Congress would have adopted it as an anti-inflationary measure. See Norman W.
Hawker, The New Antitrust Paradox: Antitrust Injury, 44 RUTGERS L REV. 101, 119 (1991).
122 Stephen Calkins, The October 1992 Supreme Court Term and Antitrust: More Objectivity Than
Ever, 62 ANTrrnusT LJ. 327, 391 (1994) ("Any application of Brooke Group... should recognize the many
respects in which it was a unique case.").
1'3 Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices under Section 2
of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 733 (1975).
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structure and industry-wide market characteristics, a firm cannot assess the
legality of a proposed price. Only after a competitor or the government
challenges the price can a firm know if the below-cost price violated the
federal antitrust laws. Business would have benefited more from a conclusive
presumption that average variable cost separates illegal from legal prices, than
from a test that depends on an ex post facto determination of the appropriate
economic theory used to interpret data in the possession of the firm's rivals."
Furthermore, the addition of the recoupment test by itself will not likely
stem the tide of predatory pricing. The Seventh Circuit saw the test as a
mechanism to provide quick dismissal of predatory pricing claims, but Brooke
Group calls for "close analysis of both the scheme alleged by the plaintiff and
the structure and conditions of the relevant market."' 25 This will undoubtedly
mean extensive discovery of economic evidence even if trial courts hold
discovery of cost data in abeyance until the issue of recoupment is resolved. 26
Predatory pricing litigation will continue to be lengthy and expensive.
Finally, Brooke Group ignores the fundamental fact that even unsuccess-
ful predatory pricing produces victims, 27 and there is a great deal of evidence
which suggests that Congress meant to protect all of the predator's victims,
not just consumers.'28 By the same token, there is scant evidence that
Congress intended to promote low consumer prices or economic efficiency to
the exclusion of everything else when it enacted the antitrust laws.
29
124 Michael L. Denger & John A. Herfort, Predatory Pricing Claims After Brooke Group, 62
ANTrrRUsT L.J. 541,558 (1994).
12 509 U.S. 209, 226 (1993).
12 Denger & Herfort, supra note 124, at 545.
127 Cf. Edwin J. Hughes, 77 MARQ. L REV. 265 (1994) (Antitrust law not only promotes efficiency,
it also redresses "particular acts of wrong doing" in the context of "damaging and unfair competition.").
128 F.T. Stimson, Trusts, 1 HARV. L REV. 132, 134 (1887); William Letwin, Law and Economic
Policy in America 70 (1965).
129 As previously noted, it defies common sense to suggest that Congress was concemed with low
prices. See Hawker, supra note 51, at 119; cf. Bryce J. Jones, 11 & James R. Turner, Can an Operating
System Vendor Have a Duty to Aid Its Competitors?, 37 JuRIMErRICS J. 355, 375 (1997) ("Although the
legislators emphasized during their debate that one purpose of the act was to lower prices to consumers,
they were also concerned that trusts were resulting in tremendous inequality of power and wealth, and they
called for fair, equal, and open opportunities for businesses to compete.").
Economists at the end of the nineteenth century, much like modem Chicago School antitrust scholars
and judges, felt that efforts by firms to monopolize markets were either economically efficient or doomed
to failure because monopoly profits would attract new entrants. Alan J. Meese, Price Theory and Vertical
Restraints: A Misunderstood Relation, 45 UCLA L REV. 143, 144-45 (1997). The Sherman Act, therefore,
may be best understood as a rejection of such thinking. Id. at 145. See also James May, Antitrust in the
Formative Era: Political and Economic Theory in Constitutional and Antitrust Analysis, 1880-1918, 50
OHIO ST. L.J. 257, 394 (1989) ("[Alntitrust analysis in 1890 substantially focused on the protection of
basic rights of labor, property, and exchange as a means to attain not only efficiency but also opportunity,
prosperity, justice, and freedom...").
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Thanks to Brooke Group, the federal antitrust laws now have a set of
relatively clear standards for predatory pricing claims. A coherent basis for
applying those standards, however, does not exist, and the standards do not
promise any assistance to businesses attempting to gage the legality of
alternative pricing strategies. Furthermore, the apparent basis for the test, low
consumer prices at any cost, is not consistent with the Congressional intent,
the nature of law in general.
IH. CANADIAN PREDATORY PRICING LAW
The earliest version of Canadas first competition law statute, the
Combines Investigation Act, 30 predates the Sherman Act by at least year.'
3'
After nearly a century of piecemeal amendments," 2 Canada substantially
revised the Combines Investigation Act and renamed it the Competition Act
("the Act") in 1986.133 Although some commentators have suggested that
Canada adopted the Act with the single minded purpose of promoting
economic efficiency, 34 Section 1.1 of the Act reveals that it serves a myriad
130 Combines Investigation Act, R.S.C., ch. C-23 (1970) (Can.).
131 See William T. Stanbury, Competition Policy in Canada: Evolution, Effectiveness and the
Changing Context of Competition, Policy Options, Oct., 1997, at 3 ("Canada's competiton policy began
with a law in 1889 aimed at price-fixing agreements"); Collins & Brown, supra note 5, at 497; Collins,
supra note 10, at 170; Maule & Ross, supra note 16, at 63 ("The Canadian Parliament passed the first
version of its antitrust law in 1889."); see generally Gordon E. Kaiser & Ian Nielsen-Jones, Recent
Developments in Canadian Law: Competition Law, 18 OTTAWA L. REV. 401 (1986); see also J. Timothy
Kennish, Competition Law and Enforcement in Canada, 20 INT'L LAW. 81, 84 (1986) ("The first Canadian
statute dealing with competiton law matters was enacted in 1888...").
132 See Maule & Ross, supra note 16, at 63-74 (1989); Carol Hamilton Jordan, An Examination of
the Proposed Amendments to the Canadian Competition Law: Bill C-91, 10 SUFFOLK T1ANSNAT'L L REV.
473, 473-77 (1986).
133 Competition Act, R.S.C., ch. C-34 (1985) (Can.), reprinted in Robert S. Nozick, The 1997
Annotated Competition Act 1-238 (1996); see also Thomas W. Ross, Introduction: The Evolution of
Competition Law in Canada, 13 Rev. Indus. Org. 1, 3-9 (1998); Lawson A.W. Hunter, Q.C. & John F.
Blakney, An Overview of the New Competition Law: Issues for the Oil and Gas Industry, 26 ALBERTA L.
REV. 59 (1987).
3 See, e.g., Stanbuty, supra note 131, at 3 ("The purpose clause of the Competition Act makes it
clear that efforts to maintain and encourage competition is a means to an end, namely promoting efficiency
and adaptability of the Canadian economy."); Donald G. McFetridge, Efficiencies Considerations in the
Competition Act: Where Now?, Policy Options, Oct., 1997, at 17 ("The philosophy underlying the Act was
that competition was a means of achieving efficient market outcomes rather than an end in itself."); Maule
& Ross, supra note 16, at 60 ("[The Act] reflects the view that competitive markets are efficient and that
the central goal of antitrust policy should be the enhancement of competition to promote the efficient use
of resources.").
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of goals.'35 The Act defines a series criminal offenses which can be tried in
either federal or provincial courts 36 and a series civil offenses that are
adjudicated by the Competition Tribunal ("the Tribunal"), a special adminis-
trative body established by the Competition Tribunal Act in 1986.1
Predatory pricing violates both criminal
38 and civil provisions 39 of the Act.140
A. Criminal Provisions
Canada amended its original Combines Investigation Act in 1935 to
prohibit predatory pricing and price discrimination."4  The prohibition on
predatory pricing is currently codified in Section 50(1)(c) of the Act which
provides:
"[E]very one engaged in a business who... engages in a policy of
selling products at prices unreasonably low, having the effect or
tendency of substantially lessening competition or eliminating a
competitor, or designed to have that effect, is guilty of an indictable
offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two
years.' 42
135 "The purpose of this Act is to maintain and encourage competition in Canada in order to
promote the efficiency and adaptability of the Canadian economy, in order to expand opportunities for
Canadian participation in world markets while at the same time recognizing the role of foreign competition
in Canada, in order to ensure that small and medium sized enterprises have an equitable opportunity to
participate in the Canadian economy and in order to provide consumers with competitive prices and product
choices." Combines Investigation Act, R.S.C., ch. C-34, § 1.1 (1985) (Can.). In the one words of one
commentator, Section 1.1 "[m]ight not be as clear a statement of the primacy of efficiency as a goal of
competition as some economists might have wished..." Ross, supra note 133, at 9; see also Hunter &
Blakney, supra note 133, at 70 n.34.
136 See American Bar Association. International Antitrust Committee., The Competition Laws of
NAFrA, Canada, Mexico, and the United States: A Practitioner's Guide 37 (1997).
137 Competition Tribunal Act, R.S.C., ch. 19 (2nd Supp.1985) (Can.). For an overview of the
Competition Tribunal see Ross, supra note 133, at 12-13; Hunter & Blakney, supra note 133, at 71-73;
Warren Grover & Robert Kwinter, The New Competition Act, 66 CAN. B. REV. 267, 268-71 (1987).
13s Combines Investigation Act, R.S.C., ch. C-34, § 50(l)(c) (1985) (Can.).
139 Section 78(i) of the Act provides that sale of "articles at a price lower than the acquisition cost
for the purpose of disciplining or eliminating a rival," R.S.C., c. C-34, § 78(i) (1985) (Can.), by a the
dominant firm in a market may constitute an abuse of dominant position in violation of Section 79 of the
Act. R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34, § 79(1).
14o See Maule & Ross, supra note 16, at 81 n.167 ("It is not clear why predation appears twice in
this way, or which route will be easier for a Director seeking to enjoin the practice.").
141 Stanbury, supra note 131, at 3.
142 Combines Investigation Act, R.S.C., ch. C-34, § 50(1)(c) (1985) (Can.). One could argue that
Section 50(l)(b)'s prohibition on price discrimination also prohibits predatory pricing. See Kennish, supra
note 131, at 88-89. To some extent this parallels the relationship of Sherman and Robinson Patman Acts
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This is essentially identical to the language previously used in Section
34(1)(c) of the earlier Combines Investigation Act.
143
Only a few criminal predatory pricing cases have been reported under
Canadian competition law. In an effort to deal with the paucity of case law
interpreting the section 50(1)(c) of the Act, the Canadian Director of
Investigation and Research ("the Director"), who is charged with enforcement
of the Act, issued Predatory Pricing Enforcement Guidelines ("the Guide-
lines") in 1992.44 Consistent with the case law, the Guidelines define
predatory pricing in general terms as "a dominant firm setting its prices so
low.., that it may drive on or more of its competitors from the market,"
enabling the successful predator "to raise prices significantly."'45
The Guidelines suggest that predatory pricing "has proven to be a rare...
occurrence in Canada" and that predatory pricing "does confer some benefits"
to consumers." Nonetheless, the Guidelines state that the benefits of
predatory pricing to consumers "will be transitory or short-term, and
eventually outweighed by increased costs during the period of recoupment." 47
Predatory pricing, moreover, frustrates and interferes "with the process of
competition in the longer term, an outcome ultimately detrimental to consum-
ers."' 41 At least one case 149 goes beyond the position of the Guidelines and
states that "[P]arliament has decided to forbid these practices because the
in the United States. This article, however, will concentrate on the "pure" predatory pricing provisions of
the Competition Act and leave the issue of price discrimination for another day.
143 See Regina. v. Consumers Glass Co. Ltd., [1981] 33 O.R.2d 228 at 230 (Quoting Section
34(1)(c) of the 1970 Combines Investigation Act: "Every one engaged in a business who... engages in a
policy of selling products at prices unreasonably low, having the effect or tendency of substantially
lessening competition or eliminating a competitor, or designed to have such effect, is guilty of an indictable
offence and is liable to imprisonment for two years.").
I" Director of Investigation and Research, Predatory Pricing Enforcement Guidelines (1992)
(hereinafter "Guidelines").
143 Id. at 1; cf Consumers Glass, O.R.2d at 231 ("[The Act penalizes predatory pricing---the
cutting of prices for anticompetitive reasons. The classically-feared case of predation has been the
deliberate sacrifice by the predator of present returns by lowering the selling price for the purpose of driving
rivals out of the market, followed by the recovery of losses and the earning of higher profits by the predator
in the absence of competition"); Regina v. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd., [1980] O.R.2d 192 ("Mhe evil of
predatory pricing is this: One company, the predator, decides to sell its product at a very low price in order
to put his competitor out of business, because they cannot or will not sell at such a low price. If the
competitor goes out of business, the predator may then increase his prices, make back the any loss as a
result of the predatory campaign and continue to reap the benefits of greater profits, because his former
competitor has now departed from the scene.").
14 Guidelines, supra note 144, at 1.
147 Id. at 1.
"' ld at2.
149 Hoffman-La Roche Ltd., O.R.2d at 192.
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public interest demands a system in which fair competition thrives" even if
"[ft]actics such as this may good business sense in certain circumstances...... 5'
On a more specific level, the Guidelines and case law agree that the
criminal offense of predatory pricing consists of four basic elements: (1) that
the defendant engaged in a business, (2) that the defendant engaged in a policy
of selling products, (3) that the defendant charged unreasonably low prices,
and (4) that the defendant did these things with the design, tendency or effect
of lessening competition or eliminating a competitor from the market.
151
Nonetheless, the case law and the Guidelines present markedly different
approaches to dealing with a number of these elements.
1. ENGAGED IN A BUSINESS
The Act defines "business" in very broad terms, 52 as did its predecessor,
the Combines Investigation Act. 153 Although there are no cases directly on
point, the apparent thrust of this requirement is to exempt transactions by
private individuals in the conduct of their personal fairs from the reach of the
statute."5
2. ENGAGED IN A POLICY OF SELLING
Only a "policy of selling" will violate Section 50(1)(c). The focus is on
the deliberateness and duration of the conduct. Thus, the Guidelines call for
evidence "to determine whether the prices in question have resulted from, and
50 Id.
151 See Guidelines, supra note 144, at 3; Hoffman-La Roche Ltd., O.R.2d at 193-213; see also,
Presley L Warner, Canada-United States Free Trade: The Case for Replacing Antidumping with Antitrust,
23 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 791, 860 ("The four elements of the 50(l)(c) offense are: (1) The accused must
be engaged in a business; (2) the accused must engage in a policy of selling products; (3) the products must
be sold at unreasonably low prices; and (4) that the policy must have the effect or tendency of substantially
lessening competition or eliminating a competitor or be designed to have that effect.").
152 Combines Investigation Act, R.S.C., ch. C-34, § 2(1) (1985) (Can.) provides that:
"business" includes the business of:
(a) manufacturing, producing, transporting, acquiring, supplying, storing and otherwise dealing in
articles, and
(b) acquiring, supplying and otherwise dealing in services.
15 Combines Investigation Act, R.S.C., ch. C-23, § 2 (1985) (Can.), provides:
business" includes the business of
(a) manufacturing, producing, transporting, acquiring, supplying, storing and otherwise dealing in
articles, and
(b) acquiring, supplying and otherwise dealing in services."
5 See Hoffman-La Roche Ltd., O.R.2d at 193 ("If someone, as a private person not engaged in a
business, sells an article for an unreasonably low price to lessen competition, he cannot be found guilty.").
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are part of, a deliberate corporate program of pricing in the market."' 55 The
trial court in Hoffinan-La Roche, however, emphasized that a policy did not
require "a formal corporate by-law or resolution approving a particular course
of action."'" Rather, the Act simply requires "a planned and deliberate course
of conduct by responsible employees of the company.' 57 As to duration, both
the Guidelines and the case law indicate that an isolated sale transaction will
not suffice. 5 '
The Guidelines suggest that price cuts made as "defensive reactions to the
pricing initiatives or behaviour of other firms" will not constitute a policy of
selling even if the price cuts are deliberate and sustained. This position finds
support in R. v. Producers Dairy Ltd.'59 where the court held that a price cut
made in response to a price concession made by a competitor did not
constitute a policy. In Hoffman-La Roche, however, the trial court seemed to
reject this position, holding instead that defensive nature of the defendant's
conduct "is a factor to be considered in deciding whether the prices were
unreasonably low.., and whether intent of the accused was to substantially
lessen competition."''
Hoffman-La Roche raised one of the more intriguing technical issues with
respect to this element. The defendant gave away an enormous amount of its
products. Some of this consisted of buy one/get one free types of
promotions,' 6 ' but the defendant also gave Valium to hospitals for free. 62 The
trial court rejected the defendant's argument that "no sale occurs when a give-
away takes place."'63 The buy one/get one free promotions really amounted
to a sale at half the regular price.' Noting that it "would be ridiculous to
hold that a sale takes place when 1,000 pills are sold for a $ 1, but not if they
were given away for free,"'6 the trial court held that "even when the goods are
given away totally free by the a producer to a customer in a commercial
context."'" Furthermore, the trial court pointed out that both sides presented
15 Guidelines, supra note 144, at 12.
156 Hoffman-La Roche Ld., O.R.2d at 193, 194.
157 See id.
'58 Id. at 193 ("[Tlhe selling must be continuing or repeated sales"); Guidelines, supra note 144,
at 12 ("[C]omplaints about a particular price which applies to one, or relatively few, market transactions
are unlikely to satisfy this test.").
159 Regina. v. Producers Dairy Ltd. (1966], C.P.R.2d 265.
16o Hoffman-La Roche, O.R.2d 193, 195.
"1 Id. at 173-74 and 176-77.
162 Id. at 177-80.
16 Id. at 195.
' Id.
165 Id. at 196.
16 Id.
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evidence from economic experts to the effect that a "zero price" transaction
constituted a sale. 67 Finally, the trial court also relied on evidence on that the
defendant considered and treated the free Valium as a commercial transaction,
not a gift.16 The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the free
Valium constituted a policy of selling since the defendant "intended to have
the long run effect of generating future sales after the elimination of the
competitor."'
' 69
3. UNREASONABLY LOW PRICES
Although the Guidelines describe the reasonableness of the prices as the
threshold issue in predatory pricing claims, 170 this is almost certainly the most
problematic of the four elements. Indeed, three distinct approaches to the
determination of whether the prices are unreasonably low appear to have
developed.
4. THE TWO STAGE ANALYSIS
Under the Guidelines, whether or not the prices are unreasonably low
depends on a two stage analysis. First, the Director examines whether the
alleged predator has market power "or the potential for building" market
power in order to determine if "it is plausible that this pricing could achieve
the anticompetitive effects described in section 50(1)(c) of the Act."'' The
existence of market power depends on market shares, concentration, and
barriers to entry.7 A firm with a market share of less than 35 percent is
unlikely to have the requisite market power,7 3 absent some barrier to entry. 174
167 Id.
163 Id. (In this case, it is clear on the evidence that the drugs being "given away" were part of a
commercial operation, not a charitable one. Invoices were normally sent to the recipients with 'no charge'
marked thereon, a practice seldom followed in a true gift situation. The donor's aim was to combat its
competitors, and to maintain its place in the market in future. The so-called free drugs, therefore, were not
really gifts from the accused; the motivation behind them being completely commercial, they were all
sales.).
169 Hoffman-La Roche Ltd., 33 O.R.2d 694 at 710.
170 Guidelines, supra note 144, at 3 ('Tl]he threshold issue in a predatory pricing complaint is the
reasonableness of the prices themselves.").
171 Id. at 6.
172 Id at 6-10.
173 Id. at 6-7 ("It is unlikely that an alleged predator with a market share of less than 35 percent
would have the ability to unilaterally industry pricing.").
174 Id. at 7 n.8 (Market power might exist "where a firm has market share of less than 35 percent
but is able to build and entrench market power through strategic behavior.").
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Even if the Director does not find sufficient evidence of predatory pricing in
the first stage of the analysis, he may "infer the likelihood of unreasonably
low prices from the totality of the circumstances, including such factors as
evidence of predatory intent or the manner and extent of elimination or
exclusion of competitors by pricing practices.'
175
In the second stage of the analysis, the Director confirms whether the
"prices are indeed unreasonably low by evaluating the relationship between
the alleged predator's prices and costs.' ' 176 Prices at or above average total
cost are reasonable per se.' 77 Prices below average variable cost are "likely
to be regarded as 'unreasonably low'..., unless there is a clear justification
such as the need to sell off perishable inventory."17' A "grey range" exists
"between average total cost and average variable cost." 179 In this grey range,
the Director will look to "the surrounding circumstances" ' to determine
whether the prices are unreasonably low. Among other things, the Director
will consider evidence of "declining demand or substantial excess capacity in
the market, ... proof that the accused was ignoring opportunities to raise
prices in the face of increasing demand, [and] evidence of the firm's intent to
use pricing for an anti-competitive purpose."''
B. The Average Variable Cost Approach
In R. v. Consumers Glass Co. Ltd.,"8 2 the Crown charged that the
defendants, Consumers Glass Co. and its subsidiary, Portion Packaging, had
engaged in predatory pricing in the small plastic lid market.8 3 More
specifically, the Crown alleged that the defendants had sold the lids at prices
substantially below cost in an effort to drive a new competitor, Amhil
Enterprises Ltd.,' out of the market.'85 Although Portion had been the only
175 Id. at 11.
176 Id. at6.
177 Id. at 10 ("[A] price set at or above the average total cost of the alleged predator will not be
regarded as 'unreasonably low' by the Director, regardless of how much market power is possessed by the
alleged predator.").
179 Id. at 10.
179 Id. at 11.
190 Id.
[$I Id.
182 Consumers Glass Co. Ltd., 33 O.R.2d 230-31.
183 Id.
194 Two former employees of Portion founded Amhil. Id.
19 Id. ("The gist of the allegation against the defendants is that they sold the small plastic lids
referred to in the indictment at prices substantially below the total cost of producing and selling those lids,
in an effort to drive a new competitor, Ambil Enterprises Ltd., out of business and so out of the lid
market.").
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source for small lids in Canada,'86 the trial court found that Portion had not
enjoyed monopoly power in the small lid market prior to Amhil's entry.'87
Potential competition from United States manufacturers as well as the ease of
entry into the small lid market sometimes effectively checked Portion's ability
to raise prices even before Amhil's entry into the market.' Portion had
previously decided to phase out its presence in the small lid market," 9 but it
decided to react aggressively to Amhil's entry into the market and "keep 100%
of our customers' business."'' The trial found that Portion dropped its below
the total cost of production not in an effort to drive Amhil from the market,
but to minimizes its losses and "permit Portion to stay in the lid business until
lids could be replaced by more profitable products."'' Eventually Portion
exited the market and Amhil became the sole Canadian supplier of small
lids.'92
The major legal issue confronting the trial court was whether Portion had
charged an "unreasonably low" price. No less a figure than Donald Turner,
co-author of the landmark Areeda-Turner test, testified as an expert witness
on behalf of the defendants. 3 The trial court extensively discussed both the
Areeda-Turner test'94 and an alternative proposed by the Crown's expert
witness, Douglas Greer, that would focus on a defendant's subjective intent
whenever prices fell below average total cost.9 Although the trial court
declined to accept the Areeda-Turner test as a rule of general application in
predatory pricing cases," the trial court nonetheless held, consistent with the
196 Id.
IS7 Id. at 232 ("While prior to August, 1975, Portion was the sole Canadian custom manufacturer
of small lids, it did not possess monopoly power over the market for small lids.").
188 Id. at 232 ("[Blecause of possible competition from the United States and the danger that one
or more of its customers might find it more economical to make its own lids, Portion's small lid prices even
before a competitor entered the market in August, 1975. were so low that, according to the evidence
introduced by the Crown, Portion was not recovering its total cost of production and sale on at least some
kinds of small lids that it made.").
9 d at 234 ("Portion had decided, again before Amhil had entered the market, to get out of the
lid market.").
190 Id. at 237.
191 Id. at 245.
192 Id. at 246 ("Portion dropped out of the small and large custom lid market some time in 1979,
which means that Amhil was thereafter the sole Canadian supplier of those lids.").
193 See id. at 247-50.
1% See id.
M9 See id. at 250-52.
19 Id. at 253 ("It is not necessary for me to decide whether the Areeda and Turner proposal is an
appropriate one for the Court to accept in all predatory pricing cases.").
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Areeda-Turner test, that "Portion always sold above its average variable cost
of production, and so it was not selling at a price unreasonably low.9
197
The average variable cost test used in Consumers Glass creates a larger
safe haven for pricing policies than the Guidelines use of average total cost for
per se legality. The reasoning in Consumers Glass, however, appears limited
by the trial court's conclusion that one could focus exclusively on average
variable costs only in cases, such as the Consumers Glass, "where there is no
evidence that the accused was not profit maximizing or loss minimizing, and
where chronic excess capacity exists, [and] there [is] no suggestion that such
price was not also above its average marginal cost."'98 Furthermore,
Consumers Glass provides no guidance to determine whether prices in any
other circumstances, including prices below average variable cost, are
unreasonable.
1. THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES
In R. v. Hoffinan-La Roche Ltd.,199 the Canadian government forced the
manufacturer of Valium and Librium to license its patents for these two drugs
to competing pharmaceutical companies. Hoffman-La Roche reacted to the
competition by (1) using various buy one/get one free types of deals to
hospitals,2' (2) offering to supply the governments Librium needs for $1,201
and (3) giving Valium to hospitals for free.2' The trial court refused to rely
solely on the defendant's subjective intent," economic theory' or a cost
based approach 5 to determine the reasonableness of the defendant's prices.
Instead, the trial court said, whether "a price is unreasonably low must depend
on all the circumstances of the sale. ''2""
197 Id. at 255. One should note that the trial court also stated that if it were to look at intent, it
would "still conclude that the accused did not adopt such a price in order to lessen competition or eliminate
Amhil as a competitor." Id.
19 Id. at 245-55.
199 Hoffman-La Roche Ltd., 28 O.R.2d 164.
2Wo Id. at 173-74 and 176-77.
201 Id. at 175-76.
M Id. at 177-80.
203 Id. at 197 ("The reasonableness or unreasonableness of a price is an objective matter, not a
subjective one. What is in the seller's mind is not important in deciding whether the price was
unreasonable.... A price may be found unreasonably low even though the seller honestly believed it was
not.").
o4 Id. at 197 ("Economic theory cannot control the legal determination of reasonable, but it is
certainly relevant.").
2 d. at 197 ("If Parliament had intended that all sales below cost be considered unreasonable, it
could have defined the term in that way. It did not.").
2W Id. at 197.
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More particularly, the trial court suggested that it should consider four
factors in deciding whether a price is unreasonably low.2°7 The first factor
calls for an examination of "the actual difference between production cost and
the sale price."2 ' Despite the trial court's reluctance to rely solely on a cost
based approach,' the trial court concluded that if "an article is sold for more
than cost, it can never be held to be unreasonable."2 0 Furthermore, "the
greater the reduction below cost, the more likely it is that the price is an
unreasonable one. 2 . What is not clear, however, is whether the trial court
was referring to average total or variable costs. The trial court further
confused the concept of costs by suggesting that "direct costs" should be
reduced by "any potential future savings or benefits.2 22 The second factor
requires the court to examine "the length of time during which sales at the
questionable prices take place. 213 As one would expect, the "longer the deal
lasts, ... the more suspect it would become. 21 4 The third factor considers
whether the price cuts are defensive or offensive. 21 5 After all, said the trial
court, "[c]ompetition is a battle... , and competitors must be allowed to
engage in that battle, as long as they do so within reason."2 6 The trial court
framed the fourth factor in economic terms by asking "whether any external
or long-term economic benefits will accrue to the seller by reducing its prices
below cost. '217 In reality, however, the test focuses on the defendant's
subjective intent. Examples of this factor given by the court include price cuts
to weather an economic down turn or to remain in a particular market "for
prestige reasons.' '218
The trial court found the various two for one type deals did not constitute
unreasonably low prices, at least in part because "some of these sales were
below cost and others were not."2 9 Although the $1 tenders to the govern-
ment were below cost,2 the trial court found that none of the other factors for
M7 Id. at 200.
2W Id.
2W9 Id. at 197 ("If Parliament had intended that all sales below cost be considered unreasonable, it
could have defined the term in that way. It did not.").
210 Id. at 200.
21 Id. at 201.
212 Id. at 199.
213 Id. at 201.
214 Id.
215 Id. at 201 ("[D]efensive price-cutting is viewed differently than offensive price-cutting. A level
of prices may be reasonable in the former situation that may not be reasonable in the latter.").
216 Id. at 201.
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 Id. at 202.
220 Id. at 203 ("[Tlhey were sales below cost.").
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unreasonably low prices were satisfied.22" ' Therefore, "they were not sales at
unreasonably low prices in all of the circumstances."'222 The free Valium,
however, constituted an unreasonably low price.223 The trial court was
particularly impressed that the plan as originally conceived and executed
lasted six months, "which is a substantial amount of time."'2 The defendant
appealed, but the Court of Appeals did not directly address this issue.
Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals seemed to uphold the trial court's opinion
on this matter when the Court of Appeals stated its agreement "with the
conclusion of the learned trial Judge that viewed in its context the supply of
Valium 'free' to hospitals constituted engaging in a policy of selling at prices
unreasonably low within.., the Act."225
2. DESIGN, TENDENCY OR EFFECr OF LESSENING COMPETITION OR
ELIMINATING A COMPETITOR
The Act only condemns a policy of unreasonably low prices when the
policy has the purpose or effect of lessening competition or eliminating a
competitor.2' Analysis of this fourth element under the Guidelines resembles
the analysis of whether the prices are unreasonably low. The Guidelines state
that the Director will look at a number of issues in assessing the competitive
impact:
(a) Has the pricing behavior had the effect of substantially lessening
competition?
(b) Has it had the effect of eliminating a competitor?
(c) Does the pricing behavior have the tendency to substantially lessen
competition?
(d) Does it have the tendency to eliminate a competitor?
(e) Is there evidence that the pricing behavior is or was designed to
substantially lessen competition or eliminate a competitor?227
221 More specifically, the trial court found that established that the $1 tenders "were made to test
the reactions of Roche's customers and competitors... ,there were only three such sales over a relatively
short period of time, during a very competitive period." Id. at 203.
222 Id. at 203.
223 Id.
2U Id.
U Hoffman-La Roche Ltd., 33 O.R.2d 694,710.
M Combines Investigation Act, R.S.C., ch. C-34, § 50(l)(c) (1985) (Can.).
2n Guidelines, supra note 144, at 13.
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A policy of selling at unreasonably low prices substantially lessens competi-
tion if it preserves or adds to market power and "there is little opportunity for
competition in the future because entry barriers are maintained or raised."22
The elimination of a competitor can be shown either by evidence that a
"competing firm has gone out of business or is otherwise no longer in a
position to constrain the ability of the alleged predator to raise prices. 229
Perhaps not surprisingly given the difference in determining the
reasonableness of prices, the trial court in Hoffman-La Roche took a different
approach to this element than the guidelines. While the guidelines largely
ignore the question of the defendant's subjective intent, the trial court in
Hoffman-La Roche emphasized that "even if there is no actual effect or
tendency," the Act is violated so long as "the conduct was designed to have
the effect or tendency of substantially lessening competition or eliminate a
competitor. ' 231 Thus, the trial court went out of its way to establish that either
the effect of the defendant's conduct or the defendant's subjective intent
would satisfy the final element of predatory pricing.
The government did not argue that the defendant's policy of giving
Valium away for free had actually resulted in a substantial lessening of
competition or eliminated a competitor, and the trial court found it highly
unlikely that the government could have prevailed on these grounds.232 Since
the defendant's competitor had survived, the government surely could not
have proved that the conduct eliminated a competitor.233 The defendant's
competitors had temporarily withdrawn from the market while the defendant
gave away Valium,23" but the free Valium had little if any lasting impact on
the structure of the market.235
The trial court, however, found ample evidence that the defendant
intended to eliminate competition. The trial court relied on specific state-
ments by defendant's employees such as: "It is our feeling that [free Valium]
will not only abort [our competitor's] efforts but serve as a warning to others
who seem to be showing an interest in this product. '236 The trial court felt
these statements went beyond "the colourful jargon of the market-place"
237
and demonstrated "a purpose -of excluding competitors, not just making it
228 Id.
229 Id.
2 Hoffman-La Roche, 28 O.R.2d at 205.
231 Id.
232 ld. at 205-06.
233 Id. at 206.
n4 Id. at 205.
235 Id. at 206.
2 Hoffman-La Roche, 28 O.R.2d at 207.
237 Id. at 208.
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difficult for them."23 The trial court was also struck by the evidence that the
defendant "was prepared to lose, and did lose, $2,600,000 worth of Valium
sales to prevent a forecast loss of $600,000 in sales to [defendant's main
competitor] in that year." '239 Furthermore, the trial court believed that the
"drastic discount" of giving away Valium for free "made no sense economi-
cally; the price was not only below cost, it was non-existent."'24 Finally, the
trial court pointed out that the defendant was not trying to enter the market, a
situation where one could expect substantial price,241 but rather to respond to
someone else's entry. The defendant's price cuts were "so out of line"242 with
those of the new entrant, that "their purpose must be suspect. 243 The Court
of Appeals expressly upheld the trial court's decision on the issue of intent,
including the trial court's use of statements by the defendant's employees as
evidence of defendant's intent.2"
C. Abuse of Dominant Position
For a United States antitrust legal scholar, one of the most intriguing
aspects of Canadian law is the attempt to prevent a dominant firm from
abusing its position. Under Section 79 of the Act, an abuse of dominant
position occurs when:
(a) one or more persons substantially or completely control, throughout
Canada or any area thereof, a class or species of business,
(b) that person or those persons have engaged in or are engaging in a
practice of anti-competitive acts, and
(c) the practice has had, is having or is likely to have the effect of
preventing or lessening competition substantially in a market.245
23 Id.
239 Id. at 210.
240 Id. at 211.
241 Id. at 211 ("One can expect substantial price cuts from a seller who is trying to enter a new
market.").
242 Id. at 211.
23 See id at 211 ("Roche's response was so outlandish that it demonstrates to me that it was not
competing with a competitor, but that it was seeking to eliminate its competitors and to substantially lessen
competition.").
2" Hoffman-La Roche Ltd., 33 O.R.2d 694, 707-09.
25 Combines Investigation Act, R.S.C., ch. C-34, § 79(1) (1985) (Can.); see also Kaiser & Nielsen-
Jones, supra note 131, at 495.
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As previously noted, the Act specifically includes certain types of below
cost sales within the definition of anticompetitve practices.246 Abuse of
dominant position is a civil offense litigated by the Director before the
Tribunal.247
The scope of this provision was tested in Canada (Director of Investiga-
tion and Research) v. NutraSweet Co.2 " NutraSweet manufactured and
distributed aspartame, an artificial sweetener. Despite that its Canadian use
patent for aspartame had expired in 1987, NutraSweet continued to hold
"exclusive contracts covering over 90% of Canadian sales. 249 The Director
argued that NutraSweet had engaged in numerous abusive tactics, including
below-cost sales.25°
The Tribunal found that NutraSweet used anticompetitive practices, but
predatory pricing was not one of them. First, the Tribunal gave a very narrow
reading to section 78(i) of the Act. The section specifically defines "selling
articles at a price lower than the acquisition cost for the purpose of disciplin-
ing or eliminating a rival",25' as an anticompetitive act. The Tribunal believed
Parliament used the phrase "acquisition cost" to limit the section scope "to
situations where articles are purchased for resale. 252 The Tribunal further
held that "acquisition cost is restricted to the cost of the articles and [does] not
[include] the cost of distributing them.' 253 Not surprisingly, the Tribunal
found NutraSweet's "prices exceeded its acquisition costs by a comfortable
"1254margin.
Although the Tribunal refused to apply Section 78(i) "to manufacturing
situations where there is not a purchase and resale of articles, 255 the examples
of anticompetitive acts identified in Section 78 of the Act are not meant to be
246 Combines Investigation Act, R.S.C., ch. C-34, § 78(i) (1985) (Can.); Isabel M. Pappe, The
Canadian Competition Act: A Leap Forward, 22 INT'L LAW. 1071, 1074 (1988) ("[A]nticompetitive
practices include a dominant firm or firms selling goods at a price that is lower than the acquisition cost.").
24. See Pappe, supra note 246, at 1072-73 (1988); William T. Stanbury, The New Competition Act
and Competition Tribunal Act: "Not with a Bang, But a Whimper", 12 CAN. Bus. L.J. 2, 37 (1986).
U8 [1990] 32 C.P.R.3d I (Competition Tribunal).
29 NutraSweet, 32 C.P.R.3d at 28.
M For an analysis of the issues other than predatory pricing in NutraSweet, see Paul Collins, The
Law and Economics of "Abuse of Dominant Position": An Analysis of NutraSweet, 49 U. TORONTO FAC.
L. REV. 275 (1991).
2 Combines Investigation Act, R.S.C., ch. C-34, § 78(i) (1985) (Can.).
252 NutraSweet, 32 C.P.R.3d at 43.
253 Id.
24 Id.; Donald N. Thompson, NutraSweet: The Evolution of Law on Abuse of Dominant Position,
18 CAN. Bus. LJ. 17, 34 (1991) (The Director's predatory pricing claim "failed because the Tribunal took
the position that the language of the statute means that Parliament intended [Section 78(i)] to be applied
to distribution (where articles are purchased for resale) and not to manufacturing situations.").
25 NutraSweet, 32 C.P.R.3d at 43.
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exclusive. 6 Consequently, the Tribunal found that other forms of predatory
pricing could constitute predatory pricing.257 Relying heavily on Areeda and
Turner's landmark article,2"' the Tribunal indicated that only prices below
average variable cost could be predatory.2"9 Although the Tribunal found
NutraSweet had "a strong commercial motive to sell below cost,"2" it also
found NutraSweet's prices exceeded its average variable cost." Furthermore,
the Tribunal felt even if NutraSweet's prices fell below cost, "it is highly
unlikely that [NutraSweet] would be able to recoup from Canadian consumers
the foregone profits resulting below-cost pricing."262 Finally, the Tribunal
concluded the Director had not asked for an appropriate remedy and refused
to decide whether NutraSweet had engaged in predatory pricing.
2 63
D. Summary and Critique
Consistency has not been the hallmark of predatory pricing law in Canada,
and several commentators have criticized the current state of the law. After
conducting an extensive examination of Canadian case law,2 McFetridge and
2 Combines Investigation Act, R.S.C., ch. C-34, § 78 ("For the purposes of section 79,
'anticompetitive acts,' without restricting the generality of the term, includes any of the following acts.");
Hunter & Blakney, supra note 133, at 69 (Section 78 "is illustrative and not exhaustive of the restrictive
and exclusionary activities the Act is aimed at preventing."); Grover & Kwinter, supra note 137, at 288
("[T]he Act provides a non-exhaustive list of nine examples that the tribunal may have regard to in
considering whether a dominant firm has abused its market position.").
" NutraSweet, 32 C.P.R.3d at 43-44 ("The tribunal [sic] is satisfied that the term 'anti-competitive
act'... is broad enough to cover other predatory pricing.").
258 Areeda & Turner, supra note 38.
259 NutraSweet, 32 C.P.R. (3d) at 44.
Mo Id. at 45; cf. Grover & Kwinter, supra note 137, at 289 (1987) (Since each of the nine
anticompetitive acts listed in Section 78 refer "to some purpose, object, or design [to lessen competition
or eliminate a competitor,] an element of intent must be demonstrated in respect to all forms of conduct
alleged to constitute an anti-competitive practice."); Bruce C. McDonald, Abuse of Dominant Position: A
New Monopoly Law for Canada, 32 ANTrrRusT BULL. 795, 812 (1987).
261 NutraSweet, 32 C.P.R.3d at 45. At different, the Tribunal vacillated between average variable
and average total cost as the appropriate threshold. In reliance on Areeda and Turner, average variable cost
was used as a proxy for the more accurate (but more difficult to ascertain) marginal cost. Id. at 44. The
Tribunal stated that when a was producing at full capacity, average total cost "is obviously the better
proxy." Id. There was some evidence that NutraSweet operated at capacity, but the decision does not state
whether NutraSweet's prices exceeded average total cost.
262 Id. at 45.
263 Id. at 45 (The Director "did not ask for any remedy concerning prices other than that they be
forbidden to fall below 'acquisition cost,' a concept that we have found to be irrelevant to this case.
Therefore a specific finding on selling below cost is not required in respect of any potential remedy.").
26 Donald G. McFetridge & Stanley Wong, Predatory Pricing in Canada: The Law and the
Economics, 63 CAN. B. REv. 685 (1985).
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Wong found the courts did not apply consistent tests for what constituted
"unreasonably low prices" or "lessened competition." 261 Although they
recommend adoption of the Areeda-Tumer test,266 McFetridge and Wong
shared Chicago's skepticism about the existence of predatory pricing267 and
expressed their own doubt "that the development of a workable jurisprudence
in the area of abuse of dominant position is a reasonable prospect. 268
More recently, Hunter and Hutton examined Canadian predatory pricing
law, including the 1992 Guidelines.2 69  They generally welcomed the
Guidelines as an "attempt to clarify the [Bureau of Competition Policy's]
approach""27 to predatory pricing, and they believed that the Guidelines will
prove "helpful to business people who suspect that their own or other's
aggressive pricing policies may be illegal. '271 Nonetheless, Hunter and Hutton
concluded that the Guidelines "fall short of their goals of providing practical
business advice and an economically sound framework for legal analysis."'272
Their economic criticisms stemmed from their belief that, consistent with
Chicago interpretations of United States antitrust law, "the underlying purpose
of the Act [is] to enhance the efficiency of the Canadian economy by
promoting competitive markets." '273 Consequently, Hunter and Hutton
criticized the Guidelines for failing "to distinguish between barriers which
result from the greater efficiency of the incumbent firm and those which are
U Id. at 699 (The cases "do not make it clear what is the test for determining if prices are
'unreasonably low,' or when the policy will, in general terms, be held to have lessened or been designed to
lessen competition."); see also Warner, supra note 151, at 861 ("The meaning of 'unreasonably low'
continues to baffle both courts and commentators.").
2" McFetridge & Wong, supra note 264, at 732 ("In our view the Areeda-Tumer test is the least
costly of these tests [for unreasonably low prices] in that it entails a low probability of convicting innocent
behavior and requires relatively little in the way of information gathering, interpretation and enforcement
effort.").
267 Id. at 733 ("If the leading [Canadian] cases are presumably the most glaring examples of
predatory pricing to come to the attention of the government, then the inescapable conclusion is that the
[predatory pricing law] is not needed.").
Id. at 733.
269 Lawson A.W. Hunter, Q.C. & Susan M. Hutton, Is the Price Right?: Comments on the
Predatory Pricing Enforcement Guidelines and Price Discrimination Enforcement Guidelines of the
Bureau of Competition Policy, 38 MCGiLL LJ. 830 (1993).
270 Id. at 833.
271 Id.
272 Id.
73 Id. at 832. Hunter and Hutton's strong Chicago bias is seen throughout their work. For
example, on the issue of predatory intent, they claim that "there is no real distinction between pro- and anti-
competitive intent, and intent is of no practical use as an evaluative criterion in predatory pricing." Id. at
845. Furthermore, they argue that 'predatory' pricing is expected and welcome in a competitive market."
Id, at 846.
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due to outside influences or strategic firm behavior." '74 Not surprisingly, they
were also critical of the use of intent to determine whether prices are
unreasonably low.275
These criticisms may go too far. First, as to consistency and predictabil-
ity, the commentators are correct that the current state of the fails to define the
appropriate measure of cost. Nonetheless, the consistent thread throughout
the case law, the Guidelines, and the NutraSweet decision is that prices above
cost are legal per se. At a minimum, this means that a business cannot be held
liable for predatory pricing so long as its price exceeds its average total cost.276
Furthermore, this is information within the control of the business, so that a
business may easily determine whether its pricing policy is placing itself at
risk. To be sure, the safe harbor of total costs may cause some overly cautious
firms to avoid making legal price cuts. Yet these must be extraordinarily
cautious firms, since none of the Canadian approaches to predatory pricing
condemn below cost pricing per se. For example, as McFetridge and Wong
concede, the criminal offense still requires "that there be a planned and
deliberate course of actual selling for a sufficient length of time." '277
Similarly, the objection of to use of intent ignores that the alleged predator's
intent is only one element of the predatory pricing case.27
The economic criticisms all share a similar problem in that they are based
on the erroneous premise that the Act's sole purpose is to promote economic
efficiency. As noted supra, the Act expressly a variety of other goals
including such as "to ensure that small and medium-sized enterprises have an
equitable opportunity to participate in the Canadian economy." '279 This
multiplicity of goals is also reflected in the statutory offenses themselves.
274 Id. at 863. "Only the later possibly pose a threat to efficient competition, as opposed to
inefficient competitors." Id. (emphasis in the original).
275 Id. at 864 ("In our view, the intent of the alleged predator is irrelevant for the purpose of
determining if its prices are unreasonably low.... We lament the inclusion of intent analysis of whether
the prices are 'unreasonably low."') Commenting on the role of intent to prove abuse dominant position,
one commentator objected that it is "notoriously difficult to distill a corporate intent from a variety of
internal memoranda and other communications by employees expressing personal views in the course of
the decision-making process within the corporation." Bruce C. McDonald, supra note 260, at 813. This
same commentator also objected that intent had no bearing on what he believed to be the critical issue,
whether the conduct lessened competition. Id. at 814.
276 Referring specifically to Section 50(l)(c), one commentator observed that a "sale above 'cost'
cannot be an anti-competitive act." Grover & Kwinter, supra note 137, at 294. This is, of course, explicitly
stated in Section 78(i) definition predatory pricing.
rn McFetridge & Wong, supra note 264, at 699 (emphasis added).
278 In an abuse of dominant position case, for example, the Director must also fill the "tall order"
of showing that the defendant or defendants "have substantial or complete control of the market [and] have
the effects of substantially lessening competition." Stanbury, supra note 247, at 34.
29 Combines Investigation Act, R.S.C., ch. C-34, § 1.1 (1985) (Can.).
PREDATORY PRICING LAW
Section 50(1)(c) prohibits unreasonably low prices that have "the effect or
tendency of substantially lessening competition or eliminating a com-
petitor .... or designed to have such effect. 28 ° Similarly, Section 78(i)
prohibits below cost pricing "for the purpose or disciplining or eliminating a
competitor." 281' The language of "design" in Section 50(1)(c) and "purpose"
in Section 78(i) requires an examination of subjective intent regardless of
economic effects. Furthermore, even if one equates "competition" with
economic efficiency as adherents of the Chicago School do, Sections 50(1)(b)
and 78(i) both require examination of the conduct's impact on competitors.
The Act provides no basis for the courts or the Tribunal to let economic
efficiency override these other goals.
IV. COMPARISON OF PREDATORY PRICING LAW IN THE UNITED
STATES AND CANADA
Perhaps the best way to understand the differences and similarities
between predatory law in Canada and the United States is to look at how the
law of each country would treat particular cases. Predatory pricing law in the
United States begins requires an analysis of two factors: whether the cost of
the goods sold exceed their price and whether the seller had a reasonable
prospect of recouping the loss through future sales at supracompetitive prices.
The government's case in Consumers Glass probably would have failed under
both prongs. Although the defendant's prices fell below average total cost,
282
the found that the defendant's prices always exceeded average variable cost.
2 3
Given the ease with which firms could enter and exit the market in question,'
the defendant could have no hope of recoupment.
The government succeeded in establishing below-cost pricing in Hoffman-
La Roche, but recoupment requires a lessening of competition and the trial
court expressed deep skepticism that the government could have proven
this. 2 5 The underlying facts support the dubious prospects for recoupment.
Although the defendant held patents for products in question, the Canadian
federal government required the defendant to license its patents to its
competitors for a relatively small royalty.26 According to the trial court, this
290 Combines Investigation Act, R.S.C., ch. C-34, § 50(1)(c) (1985) (Can.).
281 Combines Investigation Act, R.S.C., ch. C-34, § 78(i) (1985) (Can.).
282 Consumers Glass, 33 O.R.2d at 254.
283 Id. at 255.
M Id. at 232.
285 Hoffman-La Roche, 28 O.R.2d at 205-06.
2M Id. at 171.
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created "an atmosphere of vigorous competition. 287 Consequently, any
attempt by the defendant to recoup its losses by raising prices above
competitive levels would have triggered entry into the market by other
pharmaceutical firms.
In NutraSweet, the Tribunal did find high barriers to entry 8 which might
support a conclusion that recoupment was feasible. Nonetheless, the Tribunal
expressed some skepticism as to whether the defendant engaged in below-cost
pricing.289 Given the hostility to predatory pricing claims under the current
state of the law in the United States, it seems unlikely that a court would
interpret the ambiguous facts regarding costs in NutraSweet to support the
government's case. In short, it seems likely that the defendants in all three
major cases would have prevailed under the law in the United States. This
is a reversal of the outcome only in the Hoffman-La Roche case.
Application of Canadian law to the facts in Brooke Group reveals a
sharper contrast between the different approaches of the two countries. This
is so even though one must concede that it appears unlikely the abuse of
dominant position would apply to the defendant in Brooke Group. The
NutraSweet decision indicates that the Tribunal will not apply Section 78(i)
to manufacturing situations.2" Even if the Tribunal would to treat below-cost
pricing by a manufacturer as an anticompetitive act, abuse of dominant
position requires that the defendant "substantially or completely" controls "a
class or species of business" in Canada.29 In the antitrust parlance of the
United States, the defendant must have market or monopoly power.292 Of the
six firms with a significant presence in the United States market, the defendant
in Brooke Group ranked a "distant third, its market share never exceeding 12
[percent]." '293 By contrast, the two largest firms had a combined market share
of 68 percent.294 Assuming that firms held similar shares of the Canadian
market, it does not seem plausible that the defendant could exercise monopoly
power.295
27 Id. at 172.
2U NutraSweet, 32 C.P.R.3d at 27.
Id. at 44-45.
See Thompson, supra note 254, at 34.
291 Combines Investigation Act, R.S.C., ch. C-34, § 79(1)(a) (1985) (Can.).
2 See NutraSweet, 32 C.P.R.3d at 28 ([T~he Tribunal accepted the respondent's argument that
"control" under Section 79 meant "market power" which "is generally accepted to mean an ability to set
prices above competitive levels for a considerable period."); McDonald, supra note 260, at 801 ("The
question of 'control'... is a question of market power.").
293 509 U.S. at 213.
24 AL at 213 ("RJ. Reynolds and Philip Moris, the two industry leaderas, enjoyed respective market
shares of about 28 [percent] and 40 [percent].").
M The repealed definition of "monopoly" under the old Combines Investigation Act contained
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The defendant's lack of a dominant position does not affect a predatory
pricing claim under the criminal provisions of the Act. Indeed, it would
appear that the defendant's conduct in Brooke Group would have satisfied all
the elements under Section 50(1)(c). First, it almost goes without saying that
the defendant in Brooke Group, a cigarette manufacturer, was engaged in a
business, i.e., the business of manufacturing cigarettes.296 Second, the
defendant's conduct constituted a policy of selling the articles in question, i.e.,
the cigarettes. For eighteen months, the defendant sold its generic cigarettes
at prices below its costs. 297 Moreover, the conduct was no accident.2 9  Not
only did the defendant repeatedly adjust its wholesale discounts,299 the trial
court in Brooke Group found that the "corporate planning documents written
by top executives" of the defendant's buttressed the plaintiff's description of
the conduct ." In short, the defendant engaged in a deliberate program of
pricing in the market for a significant period of time.3"' With respect to the
third element of the criminal offense, unreasonably low prices, Brooke Group
found "sufficient evidence" that the defendant's prices "were below its
costs."'3°" If one assumes that by "costs" Brooke Group meant average
variable costs, then the defendant's prices clearly fell outside the safe harbor
almost the same language as "control" provision of Section 79 of the current Act, and the court in
Consumers Glass Co. Ltd., 29 C.P.R.2d I indicated that a firms who jointly coordinated their activities
might have sufficient control over a market to constitute a shared monopoly. However, the Tribunal has
tendered to interpret the current Act narrowly. See Canada (Director of Investigation and Research) v.
NutraSweet Co., 32 C.P.R.3d 1 (Holding that the express predatory pricing provisions under abuse of
dominant position were limited to purchases for resale.); Canada (Director of Investigation and Research)
v. Warner Music Canada Ltd., [1997] 78 C.P.R.3d 321 (Holding that the Act's prohibition of refusals to
deal did not extend to copyright licenses.). Consequently, it seems unlikely that the Tribunal would
aggressively interpret the definition of "control." But see Stanbury, supra note 247, at 31 ("The Department
of Consumer and Corporate Affairs in its clause-by-clause analysis of Bill C-29, which used the same
language [as Section 79 of the Act], argued that substantial control is not intended to mean virtual or
complete control. Rather, such a degree of control refers to sufficient market power to influence price by
jointly restricting output."); McDonald, supra note 260, at 802-06 (Outlining the possible elements
necessary to prove joint dominance.).
296 See 509 U.S. at 212-213.
297 See Id. at 231.
29 Cf. Hoffman-La Roche, 28 O.R.2d at 193 ("It is not enough for a violation of this section to sell
a few articles accidentally at an unreasonably low price.").
299 See 509 U.S. at 215-217.
3W Liggett Group, Inc. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 748 F. Supp. 344, 354 (M.D.N.C.
1990).
301 Cf Guidelines, supra note 144, at ii ("[A] policy of selling" requires evidence "that the prices
are part of deliberate corporate program of pricing in the market and that they are in effect for a significant
duration of time."); Hoffman-La Roche, 28 O.R.2d at 193 ("[T]he selling must be as a result of a conscious
decision to do so [and] the selling must be continuing or repeated sales.").
3M 509 U.S. at 231.
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of above cost pricing under all the approaches to unreasonably low prices.
Although Consumers Glass established that prices above average variable cost
cannot constitute unreasonably low prices, the case does not give any
guidance when, as in Brooke Group, prices fall below cost.
Hoffman-La Roche, on the other hand, required examination of three
additional factors. First, as to the length of time, Hoffmnan-La Roche indicated
that six months of below cost pricing favored a conclusion of unreasonable-
ness. The defendant in Brooke Group engaged in below cost pricing for
eighteen months. Second, Hoffman-La Roche indicated that the court must
consider "the circumstances of the sale.""3 3 The facts in Brooke Group are
subject to interpretation on this point. The defendant in Brooke Group could
characterize its price cuts as a defensive reaction to the plaintiff's low cost
generics, and unlike the defendant in Hoffman-La Roche, it did not drop its
prices to zero. Alternatively, and also unlike the Hoffman-La Roche
defendant, the Brooke Group defendant could argue that it used below cost
pricing to enter a market. Nonetheless, the considerable evidence existed that
the defendant in Brooke Group dropped its generic below its costs not to gain
a foothold in that market but rather to punish the plaintiff for creating the
generic market in the first place."
Finally, no external or long term economic benefits as defined by the trial
court in Hoffnan-La Roche accrued the benefit of the Brooke Group
defendant. 5 Brooke Group gives no indication price cuts were necessary to
stave bankruptcy, and almost by definition, the defendant's prices in the
generic market could do little to garner prestige.3"s On balance, therefore, it
would seem that the defendant in Brooke Group charged unreasonably low
prices under the Hoffnan-La Roche standard.
As previously noted, the Guidelines' analysis of prices below costs
deviates substantially from the Hoffman-La Roche standard. First, the
Guidelines look for evidence of sufficient market power to recoup its losses
from a successful predatory pricing campaign, the very ground on which the
plaintiffs case foundered in Brooke Group. The Guidelines suggest the
alleged predator must have at least a 35 percent market share to exercise the
303 Hoffman-La Roche, 28 O.R.2d at 201.
304 See 509 U.S. at 231 (Noting that a reasonable jury could conclude that the defendant
"envisioned or intended [the] anticompetitive course of events" alleged by the plaintiff.).
M5 The defendant, to be sure, did subsequently enjoy the benefits of an end to vigorous price
competition in the generic market and a reduction in competition in the branded market from generics.
Nonetheless, Brooke Group concluded that this had nothing to do with defendant's below cost pricing.
Furthermore, for a reduction in competition to constitute a long-term benefit would stand competition law
on its head.
3W See Hoffman-La Roche, 28 O.R.2d at 201.
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requisite market share.3"7 The Brooke Group defendant only had an 11.4
percent market share."3 Nonetheless, "[a] conclusive finding depends on the
assessment of the conditions of entry into an industry. ' '3°9 Although Brooke
Group largely ignored conditions of entry into the cigarette market, critics of
Brooke Group point out the cigarette industry has a history of strategic
behavior which the Guidelines might treat as a barrier to entry. 31° Finally,
given the conflicting inferences drawn from the defendant's low market share
and the history of strategic behavior in the industry, the Guidelines would look
to more subjective factors, including evidence of predatory intent.3"' On this
point, it should again be noted that Brooke Group found that a reasonable jury
could conclude that the defendant had predatory intent.31 2
The final element seeks to determine whether the defendant either caused
or intended to cause substantial lessening of competition or the elimination of
a competitor. Brooke Group specifically held the plaintiff "has failed to
demonstrate competitive injury. 31 3 Although the Guidelines focus primarily
on the competitive impact prong of this element, 3t4 both the Guidelines and
Hoffman-La Roche make it clear that testimonial and documentary evidence
of subjective intent will suffice.3"5 It bears repetition that the Brooke Group
did find sufficient evidence of predatory intent,31 6 the trial court in Brooke
Group described the evidence of subjective predatory intent as "more
voluminous and detailed than any other reported case. 31 7 More specifically,
the evidence showed not only that the defendant "wanted to injure [the
plaintiff], it also details an extensive plan to slow the growth of the generic
cigarette segment.3 a8
In short, application of the Canadian competition law to the facts outlined
in Brooke Group suggest a result entirely the opposite of that reached by the
United States Supreme Court. The key to this outcome is that Canadian
competition law would consider evidence of two things that Brooke Group
3 Guidelines, supra note 144, at 6.
"8 See 509 U.S. at 214.
309 Guidelines, supra note 144, at 7.
310 Id. at 10.
311 See id.
312 See 509 U.S. at 231.
313 Id.
314 See Guidelines, supra note 144, at 12-13.
315 See id. at 13; Hoffman-La Roche, 28 O.R.2d at 205-13.
316 See 509 U.S. at 231.
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treated as irrelevant, the history of strategic behavior in the cigarette industry
and the evidence of the defendant's subjective intent.
V. CONCLUSION
Without question, predatory pricing law in the United States and Canada
have much in common. Both countries, for example, limit predatory pricing
to sales below cost. Furthermore, neither country has developed and applied
a consistent measure of cost. These and other similarities notwithstanding,
significant differences exist between the Canadian and United States
approaches to predatory pricing.
Although NutraSweet indicates recoupment plays a role in assessing the
predatory nature of low prices, the overall approach taken by the Tribunal,
including its reference to predatory intent as both plausible and relevant,
strongly suggest that recoupment does not play the central role in Canadian
law the way it does in United States law. In this respect, Canadian law seems
much closer to the approach used by state below-cost sales statutes, than it
does to the dominant federal antitrust law.31 9
Second, Canadian predatory pricing law does offer a distinct alternative
to the Chicago approach. Although efficiency and recoupment concerns are
not rejected in the Canadian approach, issues of intent and protection of
competitors play an explicit role in the evaluation of pricing conduct. Indeed,
the Competition Act expressly states that one of its purposes is "to ensure that
small and medium-sized enterprises have an equitable opportunity to
participate in the Canadian economy."3" Thus, those who seek an alternative
path for United States antitrust law may well find it in Canadian jurispru-
dence.
319 See, Norman W. Hawker, Wal-Mart and the Divergence of State and Federal Predatory Pricing
Law, 15 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 141 (1996).
320 Combines Investigation Act, R.S.C., ch. C-34, § 1.1 (1985) (Can.).
